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The chapters that follow examine attitudes toward madness in three writers of the 
eighteenth century, Jonathan Swift, David Hume, and Charlotte Lennox. This is not a 
biographical or clinical study. Diagnosis is not the goal of this work, nor does this thesis seek to 
study the writings of people who suffered from mental disorder (Cowper, Smart, etc.).
1
 Rather, 
the following chapters seek to characterize each writer’s understanding of the causes of madness 
and his or her prescribed cure. I will argue that each of these three writers understood madness to 
be some form of departure from common life, the sphere of shared experience upon which social 
bonds are founded. I chose to focus on these writers and works because I perceived a recurrence 
of themes in their works regarding questions of subjectivity, truth, and striking a livable balance 
between the two. For these writers, madness was sometimes the only way to adequately convey 
the horrible anguish of alienation from common life. 
In each chapter, I will attempt to outline what madness signified to the writer and what 
cure he or she thought was possible. All three writers are united in perceiving madness to be a 
function of individual hubris, a failure to recognize one’s own human fallibility and belief in 
having privileged access to truth. This contempt for the supposed ignorance of common life 
leads one to adore one’s own seemingly perfect system of thought. As one begins to commit to 
one’s own ideas instead of people, madness ensues. In Swift’s “Digression Concerning 
Madness” from his Tale of a Tub (1704) and Lennox’s The Female Quixote (1752), this madness 
                                                          
1 Some people thought Swift was mad. Samuel Johnson in Lives of the Poets (1781) wrote, 
…having by some ridiculous resolution, or mad vow, determined never to wear 
spectacles, he could make like little use of books in his latter years; his ideas, therefore, 
being neither renovated by discourse, nor increased by reading, wore gradually away, and 





erupts as a corruption of language.  In Swift, the act of treatise-writing is an explicit assault on 
common life, whereby the treatise-writer stakes out his idiosyncratic definitions in a common 
language and denies shared thought. 
Nonetheless, the three diverge from each other in important ways as well. Most notably, 
Swift does not perceive any reliable cure for irrationality, which he takes to be a metaphor for the 
profound moral degradation of humanity. The gap between truth and what he perceives to be the 
fundamental irrationality as well as continual self-delusion of the human condition generates 
ultimately irresoluble tensions in Swift’s “Digression.” Swift does allude to common life as a 
kind of innocent, bucolic ideal, but he does not suggest any satisfactory way for the learned man 
to rejoin common life, or any possibility of curing the Tale-Teller’s madness. 
In contrast to Swift, Hume and Lennox do perceive a means of engaging individual 
consciousness and common life. In his A Treatise of Human Nature (1740), Hume describes 
inner life to be continuous with common life - our passions are not our own, and our very being 
is actuated by the passions of others, such that “We can form no wish, which has not a reference 
to society” (2.2.5, 234). Prolonged solitude thus deprives us of the opportunity to correct our 
attitudes. Alone, we form our wishes and ideas with reference to a static, distorted image of 
society in our head, and convince ourselves that we are persecuted by and enemies of common 
life. Only by mixing in company can we calm our perturbed passions and become reasonable 
again. Hume calls this communication of passions the principle of sympathy. It is by sympathy 
that Hume finds his way out of his mental crisis. 
Lennox’s novel draws together Swift and Hume’s ideas about madness by showing us a 
character with a Swiftian malady and Humean cure. In The Female Quixote, Arabella convinces 




truth. Like Swift’s Tale-Teller, Arabella essentially inhabits a corrupt textual fantasy that casts 
the self as the infallible center. Only when her corrupt form of language undergoes reformation 
into a dialogue of Humean sympathy can she join common life as Glanville betrothed. For 
Lennox, the reconciliation of individual desire with common life is thus idealized as marriage. 
The following chapters all explore a kind of madness that develops in solitude. Overall, 
the trend in the texts examined is towards a recognition of the fallibility of the human self or 






Breaking Up the Empire of Reason:  




The critic F. R. Leavis saw Swift as an example of negative, destructive energy. In “The 
Irony of Swift,” Leavis comments, 
The positive itself appears only negatively—a kind of skeletal presence, rigid enough, 
but without life or body; a necessary pre-condition, as it were, of directed negation. 
The intensity is purely destructive. 
 
Elsewhere, Leavis writes, “Swift’s [irony] is essentially a matter of surprise and negation: its 
function is to defeat habit, to intimidate and to demoralize” (75). Leavis finds the negativity of 
Swift to be overwhelming, leaving nothing behind. He points to the passage of the knaves and 
the fools in “A Digression Concerning Madness” as his crowning evidence for Swift’s 
destructiveness. However, I would like to argue that, quite to the contrary, Swift’s prose is 
productive to the point of virulence.  The passages which Leavis singles out tend to produce 
rather than destroy meanings and interpretations. In the “Digression,” Swift demonstrates the full 
range and power of irony as a rhetorical device. The fecundity of images and meanings in The 
Tale of a Tub yields a host of Swifts in the readers’ minds. The critic Ricardo Quintana identifies 
no less than four such Swifts: Bewildered Swift, Swift as Betrayed Idealist, Swift as Absurdist, 
and Swift as Moralist (1975, p. 16). The parodic fracture of meaning and language parallels the 
defects that Swift perceives in human reason, whose diagnostic impulse he suggests is guilty of 
an active offense against common life. As I will demonstrate, this does not constitute a simple 
case of destruction on the part of the Tale-Teller, but semantic overgrowth of cancerous excess. 
 Destruction, when it does occur, is performed by the reader. In the attempt to read, we 




Tale-Teller. If the Tale-Teller does destroy, it is our complacency which he undertakes to undo. 
However, even then, he does not leave us with nothing, but instills in its place anxiety, 
restlessness, and disgust. 
 The reader also undertakes some positive work as well. We resist the Tale-Teller’s 
arguments based on the conclusions generated by our own common sense. In that sense, the 
“Digression Concerning Madness” is an argument for authentic, common life, which the Tale-
Teller cannot ever hope to understand. For Swift, life is most readily identified by its resistance 
to written characterization. The conclusion of the “Digression” purports to reintegrate the 
inhabitants of insane asylums into the Bedlam of society. In that section, Swift caricatures in 
disgusting detail the different trades and professions. The fact that these figures so readily lend 
themselves to caricature is proof enough for Swift of their lifelessness. 
 To the extent that it is pessimistic and insists on exposing corruption, the “Digression” 
does engage negative emotion. But it is very strange to write of the pessimism of the 
“Digression,” for we are not sure where it originates. It probably does not belong to the Tale-
Teller, who advertises his conclusions as a testament to his intelligence. Does the pessimism 
belong to Swift? Us? 
 Leavis argues that there are no positive values to be found in Swift. But what do we mean 
by positive? Socially sanctioned moral values? But Swift proposes to preserve traditional values, 
via “a manner that should be altogether new” (2). In the “Apology” he attaches to the book after 
the first publication of A Tale of a Tub, Swift explains his motivations thus: 
he thought the numerous and gross corruptions in Religion and Learning might furnish 
matter for a satire that would be useful and diverting. He resolved to proceed in a manner 
that should be altogether new, the world having already been too long nauseated with 
endless repetitions upon every subject. The abuses in Religion he proposed to set forth in 
the Allegory of the Coats and the three Brothers, which was to make up the body of the 





Far from desiring destruction, Swift wishes to revive our moral life (or at least, insists he does). 
The satire he writes is meant to be “useful and diverting” (2) – that is, socially productive, 
serving solemn ends in addition to light ones, producing moral convictions as well as laughter, 
an aid to the everyday affairs of the household that serves as well for comic chastisement. The 
modest, even domestic, scale of the Tale’s aims (to be “useful and diverting”) contrasts greatly to 
the size of the institutions he means to tackle. It is perhaps characteristic of Swift to value things 
that come in small sizes: children and small pleasures like laughter or “bread and butter” (79). In 
Swift, offenses of leviathan proportions are best exposed and intensified by compression and 
transferral into a domestic context. He adapts the “abuses of Religion” into a feud among three 
brothers. When he writes disapprovingly of power-crazed kings in the “Digression,” he focuses 
on the decimation of quotidian order: 
a mighty king, who, for the space of above thirty years, amused himself to take and lose 
towns, beat armies and be beaten, drive princes out of their dominions, fright children 
from their bread and butter, burn, lay waste, plunder, dragoon, massacre subject and 
stranger, friend and foe, male and female. (79) 
Swift begins by noting the king’s efforts to “take and lose towns.” The conquests of “armies” 
and “dominions” are secondary concerns compared to the “children” and their “bread and 
butter.” Even when this bully of a king does receive his rebuke in the form of a defeat, the costs 
are too heavy. Swift links the martial verbs together in a trail that visualizes the swath of 
destruction left behind by war. Regardless of their righteousness, everybody suffers and becomes 
a victim, “subject and stranger, friend and foe, male and female.” Swift suggests that the 
devastation of war renders any victory pyrrhic at best. In the aftermath of battle, the most basic 





In the “Digression Concerning Madness,” the Tale-Teller is not only engaged in a 
digression from the main allegory, but also constantly digresses from the thesis he purports to 
advance, namely, the superiority of madness to reason. Here, Swift assumes a satirical persona 
whose tone contrasts greatly to the one he takes in his sermons: 
I have long sought after this opportunity of doing justice to a society of men for whom I 
have a peculiar honour, and whose opinions as well as practices have been extremely 
misrepresented and traduced by the malice or ignorance of their adversaries.  For I think 
it one of the greatest and best of human actions to remove prejudices and place things in 
their truest and fairest light, which I therefore boldly undertake, without any regards of 
my own beside the conscience, the honour, and the thanks. (77) 
 
Swift parodies the treatise writer as a hypocrite who justifies his own prejudices in the name of 
reason. No sooner does the Tale-Teller admit his “peculiar honour” for madmen than he 
proceeds to pronounce “it one of the greatest and best of human actions to remove prejudices and 
place things in their truest and fairest light” (77). The critic Michael DePorte remarks, “Through 
the character of the Hack, then, Swift is able to continue the attack on that insane subjectivity 
which is for him the chief symptom of ‘modernity’” (DePorte 76). Swift’s Tale-Teller is a 
provoking figure whose language and imagery seem calculated to offend. For instance, the 
opening paragraph of the “Digression” makes frequent references to excrement, drawing on 
“steams from dunghills” and “the fumes issuing from a jakes” as illustrations:  
For great turns are not always given by strong hands, but by lucky adaptation and at proper 
seasons, and it is of no import where the fire was kindled if the vapour has once got up into 
the brain.  For the upper region of man is furnished like the middle region of the air, the 
materials are formed from causes of the widest difference, yet produce at last the same 
substance and effect.  Mists arise from the earth, steams from dunghills, exhalations from the 
sea, and smoke from fire; yet all clouds are the same in composition as well as consequences, 
and the fumes issuing from a jakes will furnish as comely and useful a vapour as incense 
from an altar. (78) 
 
Notably, Swift mocks theoretical writing by parodying the form and tone of the learned treatise. 




long clauses and transitional words and phrases such as “for” and “yet” that usually indicate the 
logical progression of ideas. However, upon closer inspection, the Tale-Teller’s points and 
examples appear suspect. To begin with, the logic of the Tale-Teller’s argument that “the fumes 
issuing from a jakes will furnish as comely and useful a vapour as incense from an altar” (78) is 
obviously askew. Anybody with a functioning nose and olfactory bulb (i.e., a three-year-old) can 
distinguish between the “substance and effect” of an outhouse as opposed to altar candles. Swift 
deliberately offers such offensive, malodorous, and absurd examples in order to excite our 
common sense and distrust of ostensibly learned writing. Swift ridicules the Tale-Teller’s 
confidence that he can generate a theory that explains something as complex as the human mind. 
Indeed, as the treatise progresses, these theories and the language in which they are posed only 
generate further paradoxes. The Tale-Teller’s diagnostic language, rather than clarifying matters, 
only serves to perpetuate misunderstanding and to lead us deeper into madness. As the critic 
Robert Phiddian observes, “The text frustrates the reader, involving her or him in the 
construction of meanings and their contexts while simultaneously sowing the seeds of 
deconstruction and promiscuously plural meaning.” Swift parodies the act of diagnosis in learned 
treatises, mocking it as only a heightened form of madness in its presumption and bias. 
Accordingly, Swift works to foster the reader’s distrust of treatise-writers and their motivations. 
As far as Swift is concerned, human reason is deeply corrupted in its constrictiveness, such that 
even its aspirations to reason become a form of bias that estranges the learned mind from the rest 
of humanity. 
The Tale-Teller’s many diagnostic theories and metaphors tend to proliferate rather than 
curb madness. Of the many models which the Tale-Teller proposes for explaining madness, one 




Let us next examine the great introducers of new schemes in philosophy, and search till 
we can find from what faculty of the soul the disposition arises in mortal man of taking it 
into his head to advance new systems with such an eager zeal in things agreed on all 
hands impossible to be known; from what seeds this disposition springs, and to what 
quality of human nature these grand innovators have been indebted for their number of 
disciples, because it is plain that several of the chief among them, both ancient and 
modern, were usually mistaken by their adversaries, and, indeed, by all, except their own 
followers, to have been persons crazed or out of their wits, having generally proceeded in 
the common course of their words and actions by a method very different from the vulgar 
dictates of unrefined reason, agreeing for the most part in their several models with their 
present undoubted successors in the academy of modern Bedlam, whose merits and 
principles I shall further examine in due place. (80) 
 
Swift proposes that conquering kings, philosophers, and founders of new religions must be mad 
for choosing to advance “a method very different from the vulgar dictates of unrefined reason” 
(80). The circumlocution of the Tale-Teller enacts the very point Swift is making: his “method” 
of writing, with all its peculiarities in phrasing and tone, identifies him as being somewhat 
unhinged. His contempt for common thought is indicated by his reference to “the vulgar dictates 
of unrefined reason” (80), Swift’s joke being that in advocating refined reason, the Tale-Teller 
advocates madness. According to this model of madness, the Tale-Teller and other treatise-
writers like him must be mad too, for wishing “to advance new systems with such an eager zeal 
in things agreed on all hands impossible to be known” (80). At such moments when the Tale-
Teller seems must unconscious of his own complicity in madness, Swift seems to be speaking up 
behind him, particularly when he argues against those who would “advance new systems…in 
things agreed on all hands impossible to be known” (80). Based on our earlier analysis of the 
opening passage of the “Digression,” we know that Swift bears nothing but contempt for the 
“systems” that humans would devise. Indeed, the Tale-Teller has been advancing such “systems” 
all along in this digression on a subject that is “impossible to be known” (80) to this present day. 
In his eagerness to censure fellow treatise writers seeking to proselytize their own “systems,” the 




others. Of course, in his unconsciousness and lack of insight into his own faulty thinking, the 
Tale-Teller exhibits classic signs of unreason.  
If leaders (“great prescribers,” 81) are mad because their methods are mad, then their 
followers (“implicit disciples,” 81) must also be mad for going along with such craziness. The 
Tale-Teller is therefore compelled to explain how it is that the rest of the world (which, 
presumably, is sane) comes to follow the notions of these mad leaders. The Tale-Teller’s 
resulting theory ends up generating new contradictions:  
for there is a peculiar string in the harmony of human understanding, which in several 
individuals is exactly of the same tuning.  This, if you can dexterously screw up to its 
right key, and then strike gently upon it whenever you have the good fortune to light 
among those of the same pitch, they will by a secret necessary sympathy strike exactly at 
the same time.  And in this one circumstance lies all the skill or luck of the matter; for, if 
you chance to jar the string among those who are either above or below your own height, 
instead of subscribing to your doctrine, they will tie you fast, call you mad, and feed you 
with bread and water. (81) 
 
Faced with the conundrum of devising a suitable explanation that preserves the greater 
population from charges of madness, the Tale-Teller is obliged to propose a social model of 
madness. This model nonetheless allows for the possibility of the existence of truth or reason as 
an absolute entity independent of the “peculiar string in the harmony of human understanding” 
(81). According to this model, we are all mad and the “right key” (81) is only “right” insofar as 
people agree it is. We simply suffer from sharing the same variety of madness, so that we think 
ourselves sane because we share the same unhinged outlook and are unhinged to the same 
degree. Human agreement, then, has nothing to do with rational processes and everything to do 
with chance or “fortune,” depending on the disposition of the mind, “which in several individuals 
is exactly of the same tuning,” and “luck” (81). The musical metaphor is a striking image and 
probably the Tale-Teller’s most beautiful one. The Tale-Teller endorses the “secret necessary 




those who would pass judgment on others, “tie you fast, call you mad, and feed you with bread 
and water” (81). In his quickness to resent the presumption of his neighbors, the Tale-Teller 
seems entirely unaware of being guilty of the same misdemeanor in desiring others to join in 
“subscribing to your doctrine” (81). Likewise, the Tale-Teller entirely neglects to comment on 
truth and reason, being so preoccupied with defending the beauty of “the harmony of human 
understanding” (81) that he entirely disregards the larger problem of knowing the truth.  
As the Tale-Teller proceeds in his argument, we find ourselves dragged deeper into his 
biased way of thinking. He begins with the innocuous assertion that individual madness begins 
with the overthrow of “reason” and “the senses” by “fancy” and “imagination”: 
But when a man’s fancy gets astride on his reason, when imagination is at cuffs with the 
senses, and common understanding as well as common sense is kicked out of doors, the 
first proselyte he makes is himself; and when that is once compassed, the difficulty is not 
so great in bringing over others, a strong delusion always operating from without as 
vigorously as from within.  (82) 
In the figure of the Tale-Teller, Swift constructs a vision of humanity as morally degraded, 
incapable of rising above the level of the gutter. Even as the Tale-Teller discusses such abstract 
notions as the state of the human mind, bawdy connotations creep into his description of “when a 
man’s fancy gets astride on his reason”(82). His depiction of madness contains an analogy to 
domestic violence, literalizing the imagination and reason as an uneasy relationship of 
cohabitation in which “imagination is at cuffs with the senses, and common understanding as 
well as common sense is kicked out of doors” (82). The bawdy suggestions in his metaphor for 
madness, “when fancy gets astride on his reason,” dramatize the dangers posed by the egotistic 
human mind when it becomes so enamored of its own likeness that it wishes to replicate itself by 
persuading others to its cause. Imagination and reason come together to generate a host of 




ways of error, of language slippery and bereft of contact with true authority, and stranded in the 
wreckage of flawed attempts to speak authentically” (170). We might also add that the task of 
determining the truth is complicated by the challenge of listening authentically, of recovering our 
sense for authentic truth. 
In reading Swift, we find any number of interpretations and images possible, down to the 
individual word (“reason,” “fool,” “knave,” “senses,” etc.). The opening image of this passage 
(“when a man’s fancy gets astride on his reason,” 82) can be read otherwise, as a quite innocuous 
comparison to a horse and rider. Indeed, in the concluding paragraphs to the digression, the Tale-
Teller makes the equestrian comparison explicit: 
I am a person whose imaginations are hard-mouthed and exceedingly disposed to run 
away with his reason, which I have observed from long experience to be a very light 
rider, and easily shook off. (87) 
 
Even so, a dream-like fluidity suffuses this passage. We find a subtle inversion of objects. Where 
previously “fancy” is the rider that “gets astride on his reason” (82), here “reason” becomes the 
“rider” to his “hard-mouthed” steed, imagination. We also find any number of possible 
interpretations – we can easily see the Tale-Teller in the first instance as arguing for the reign 
(and rein) of fancy over reason, since his discussion of happiness as a delusion is pressed into 
service as a proof of the boons of madness. However, we might also read the image as 
commentary from Swift suggesting the necessary state of humanity to be reason. Without the 
tyrannical interference of the rider (reminiscent of the rampaging conquerors on horseback at the 
beginning of the piece, albeit on a smaller scale), reason would be free to operate unhindered.  
 The inversion is not perfect; whereas in the first instance, the rider, fancy, has perfect 
control over his beast (ironically, reason is figured as non-human), at the second instance of this 




The one overriding consistency in this transposition of roles is that imagination wins out over 
reason. Nonetheless, both instances of the horse-and-rider image retain a lively sense of 
antagonism. Interestingly, in his concluding image, the Tale-Teller’s reason is hostage to his 
imagination, suggesting that in this instant at least, he longs for reason. 
Swift anticipates Saussure’s insight into what the latter termed the arbitrariness of the 
sign. The horse-and-rider image and the subsequent inversion not only draws our attention to 
their arbitrariness, but also makes the case for the instability of the linguistic sign. Swift suggests 
that reality and meaning are far apart in the human conception of the world. Alarmingly, the 
Tale-Teller succeeds in propagating his methods and systems in his readers. We become “mad 
interpreters of Swift’s text” (382), as the critic Terry Castle puts it. In writing about Swift, we are 
compelled to fall into the same process of inversion and admit the impossibility of describing 
precise relationships in the world. In a sentence reminiscent of that relationship of syntactic and 
figurative inversions which the Tale-Teller delights in, Castle writes that the Tale of a Tub “is at 
once a hallucination of Text and a hallucinatory text” (382). Swift’s horse and rider haunt us 
phantom-like long after we put down the Tale.  
The difficulty of interpretation in Swift thus dramatizes the essential moral trap of 
humanity as Swift understands it. We find our understanding of Swift’s text to vary to the extent 
that we can no longer identify the original authoritative meaning, if such a meaning exists at all. 
We can interpret “When fancy gets astride on his reason” in any number of ways. Castle writes, 
“On the most profound level (the level of dream?), Swift’s satire is motivated by a vision, 
potentially fearful, of the written artifact as a radically unstable object” (383). Part of the 
perceived instability derives from the wildly shifting attitudes. We perceive not one, but several 




 A number of startling, disorienting reversals occur in this passage:  
For cant and vision are to the ear and the eye the same that tickling is to the touch.  Those 
entertainments and pleasures we most value in life are such as dupe and play the wag 
with the senses.  For if we take an examination of what is generally understood by 
happiness, as it has respect either to the understanding or the senses we shall find all its 
properties and adjuncts will herd under this short definition, that it is a perpetual 
possession of being well deceived.  And first, with relation to the mind or understanding, 
it is manifest what mighty advantages fiction has over truth, and the reason is just at our 
elbow: because imagination can build nobler scenes and produce more wonderful 
revolutions than fortune or Nature will be at the expense to furnish.  (83) 
 
The Tale-Teller shifts from speaking of the madness of crowds and individuals (“a strong 
delusion always operating from without as vigorously as from within,” 83) to madness as a result 
of psychological as opposed to physical stimulation. The shift is peculiar; the Tale-Teller 
switches from discussing how the masses take up the madness of their leaders (the social 
phenomenon of madness) to varieties of individual madness. The Tale-Teller suggests that there 
is a distinction between delusion and reality, that fancy is allied with delusion and reason with 
reality. However, the Tale-Teller uses this to support his argument for madness.  
We are not certain how exactly to understand the tone of the Tale-Teller when he speaks 
of “cant and vision” (which he seems to take to be equivalent with “entertainments and 
pleasures,” though “cant and vision” speaks of hypocritical piety and “entertainments and 
pleasures” of unabashed sensual pleasure). By the end of the passage, the Tale-Teller proceeds 
from a commonly held assumption (madness as imaginative excess) to arrive at the conclusion 
that happiness is a state of pleasing madness, being essentially a form of self-delusion, “a 
perpetual state of being well deceived” (83). Even though our every instinct objects to the Tale-
Teller’s conclusion, we find ourselves unable to immediately dismiss the Tale-Teller’s 
arguments. Not only does the Tale-Teller fail to provide an illuminating explanation of madness, 




not for the assistance of artificial mediums, false lights, refracted angles, varnish, and tinsel, 
there would be a mighty level in the felicity and enjoyments of mortal men” (83). We become 
infected with the Tale-Teller’s ideas and unseemly images. 
However, the abrupt reversals do not end there. The Tale-Teller praises madness, but 
momentarily ventures to speak from the mainstream view (delusion is bad, objective and 
unvarnished truth is good) when he writes of the blame that some may attach to humanity for 
choosing madness. His assumption of a natural attachment of blame to the choice of delusion 
suggests that he values objective truth as well. Indeed, his subsequent argument is based upon 
the notion that no blame ought to be incurred in the question of happiness, since in the brain, 
there is no difference between memory and the imagination: “whether things that have place in 
the imagination may not as properly be said to exist as those that are seated in the memory? 
which may be justly held in the affirmative” (83). After arguing all along for the superiority of 
madness to sanity, the Tale-Teller now claims that regardless, there is no viable difference 
between delusion and memory, such that fancy and reason are continuous in the human mind. In 
other words, the human mind is inherently irrational and subjective. However, no sooner does he 
attempt to collapse the category of sane recall of truth (“memory”) into mad delusion 
(“imagination”) than he proceeds to assert the superiority of imagination to reason. The Tale-
Teller thus flips between refusing to recognize a difference between imagination and reason (but 
admitting subjectivity as a fact and essential facilitator of human existence), and recognizing the 
distinction but attempting to impose his own value hierarchy by privileging imagination above 
reason (“[imagination is] acknowledged to be the womb of things, and the other [memory] 
allowed to be no more than the grave,” 83). 




How sad and insipid do all objects accost us that are not conveyed in the vehicle of 
delusion!  How shrunk is everything as it appears in the glass of Nature, so that if it were 
not for the assistance of artificial mediums, false lights, refracted angles, varnish, and 
tinsel, there would be a mighty level in the felicity and enjoyments of mortal men. (83)  
 
These two pronouncements represent the Tale-Teller’s triumphant assertion of the importance of 
madness and delusion and their benefits. The irony in this passage thus serves to demonstrate the 
fluidity of textual meaning and its dependence on the values (which are so difficult to entangle 
from their petty cousins, prejudice and whim) of the speaker and audience. If we read any kind 
of longing for truth into this passage, we cannot be sure that it was native to the text or 
interposed by our own desire. In other words, we find it impossible to read without bias, the 
influence of which the Tale-Teller would gleefully equate with delusion. 
We detect a note of oddity in the Tale-Teller’s reference to “delusion” in his exclamation. 
Even as the Tale-Teller embraces the imagination, he seems to loathe it or retain ambivalence by 
referring to its effect as “delusion” rather than “fancy” or the “imagination.” Typically, we think 
of delusion as a bad thing, as deception or a form of cheating. As such, “delusion” carries a note 
of resentment or disappointed expectations. At these moments, the reader can no longer be 
certain whether her understanding is congruent with the Tale-Teller’s intended meaning or if she 
is projecting her values and assumptions onto the text when she perceives a note of mourning in 
the Tale-Teller’s tone. In reading Swift, we find it impossible to disentangle our personal 
reactions from the Tale-Teller’s arguments.  
The intractability of disentangling the multiple tones and voices persists in the Tale-
Teller’s next sentence: “How shrunk is everything as it appears in the glass of Nature, so that if it 
were not for the assistance of artificial mediums, false lights, refracted angles, varnish, and 
tinsel, there would be a mighty level in the felicity and enjoyments of mortal men” (83). The 




“Nature” is the mediating, artificial medium, being a “glass” that causes everything to appear to 
have “shrunk” (83) from its accustomed size. It is difficult to ascertain whether the Tale-Teller 
means by “Nature” the concept that we mean. The Tale-Teller seems to have absorbed his own 
dictum that the imagination and the memory (one possible interpretation of the “glass of 
Nature”) are contiguous, such that the natural mirror of memory becomes another variant of 
human subjectivity, serving to make us sad instead of happy, to shrink instead of aggrandize. 
Swift continues to complicate the tone with his evocations of the dichotomy between falseness 
and truth, which we find difficult to consider separately from our valuations and preference of 
truth over falsehood.  When the Tale-Teller writes of the necessity for “artificial mediums, false 
lights, refracted angles, varnish, and tinsel” (83), he inevitably excites our suspicions and caution 
(we do not call candles “false lights”) against his argument for the superiority of the imagination. 
“Tinsel” in particular suggests a negative evaluation of imagination as a cheapening of 
experience or attractiveness without worth. It is unclear whether “tinsel” is spoken by the 
moralist Swift or the Tale-Teller (whose own values have deviated so far from the mainstream 
that we can no longer assume that he means the same thing by “tinsel” that we do) or the 
mischievous Swift playing wag with our senses, or perhaps all three, since they need not be 
exclusive of one another. Thus, we can see that Swift’s prose is constructed to maximize the tug-
and-pull of several tensions and value systems. The effect is hallucinatory in that we cannot be 
certain who is speaking at any one moment, or how many are speaking, or consequently even 
what they are saying. Though the impression is of one speaker (since there is one physical text 
before us), we soon find ourselves stumbling in the midst of the splintering of tones and attitudes 




seems to mean any number of things, such that we despair of acquiring even a literal 
understanding. 
The Tale-Teller indulges in a redundancy of phrasing when he writes of “a mighty level 
in the felicity and enjoyments of mortal men” (83). The redundancy repeats in both “felicity and 
enjoyments” and “mortal men,” in which he combines an etymologically French or Latin word 
with a simpler (syllabically or otherwise) one meaning similar, if not fully identical, things. This 
repetition seems to be a symptom of the Tale-Teller’s pomposity and circularity. We might also 
read this as an intrusion of other voices into the text, in which the bread-and-butter Swift crosses 
rapier wits with the flamboyant Tale-Teller who relishes such polysyllabic words as 
“emolument” (81). 
Swift’s satire specializes in playing upon familiar notions and exposing their 
contradictions by proceeding to draw such disturbing conclusions as to make us doubt our former 
assumptions. We become utterly lost as to what Swift means when he writes of “reason” or 
“happiness” (82). Rooted in Swift’s prose is a deep sense of loss of certainty about meaning that 
parallels his sense of estrangement from truth and moral purity. The critic Richard Quintana 
writes of Sir Francis Bacon what might well be said of Swift: “What he desired above all for 
himself and for mankind was true knowledge of Nature, that is, of the Divinely-created 
universe.” But Swift was much more pessimistic about the possibility of finally acquiring that 
true knowledge. 
Essentially, the Tale-Teller argues the case for madness as a beneficial force, which is 
responsible for not only national and scientific advances, but also human happiness. The Tale-
Teller undertakes to make a reasoned argument for madness, but it breaks down midway through 




us praise that blames and blame that praises” (19). However, we find that we are duped when we 
think that we grasp a key to Swift’s meaning as we realize the views of Swift and the Tale-Teller 
coincide in the question of happiness. In his analysis of the Tale-Teller’s exclamation “How sad 
and insipid do all objects accost us,” Leavis identifies a “sudden change of tone and reversal of 
attitude…as if one found Swift in the place – at the point of view – where one expected to find 
his butt” (373). In the face of this unexpected conclusion to the initial proposition that madness is 
an excess of “fancy,” the reader cannot help but resent the Tale-Teller’s conclusions as an 
unlooked-for burden, which we can only dismiss by condemning it as a symptom of the Tale-
Teller’s subjectivity. We recognize that many of the Tale-Teller’s arguments are perversely 
reasoned. Swift’s irony thus depends on the reader’s inner mechanisms of moral correction to 
recognize and condemn the erroneous, specious arguments that the Tale-Teller advances. Irony is 
thus the perfect rhetorical device for stimulating the development of a rhetorical conscience that 
mirrors the moral conscience. In reading Swift, the reader is compelled to be vigilant in her 
monitoring of Swift’s ideas. At no time are we permitted to accept his words at face value. The 
Tale-Teller’s words constitute surface appearances, pliable to the prejudices and whims of the 
Tale-Teller’s intentions, whose influence we only feel all too strongly. 
The Tale-Teller argues for “credulity” as being preferable to “curiosity.” This is in 
accordance with his general attitude throughout the treatise, which is that madness, delusion, and 
appearances are preferable to the ugliness of the truth which philosophy seeks to uncover. He 
values “credulity” because of the peace it affords him, suggesting that peace is another quality 
favored by the Tale-Teller or Swift (in accordance with the “bread-and-butter”). However, his 
attitude quickly becomes complicated in the subsequent clause of the same sentence. He writes,  
In the proportion that credulity is a more peaceful possession of the mind than curiosity, 




philosophy which enters into the depths of things and then comes gravely back with 
informations and discoveries, that in the inside they are good for nothing (83) 
 
What complicates these attitudes is the attachment of counterintuitive descriptors to concepts 
which we generally associate otherwise: by definition, “philosophy” considers the profound 
question of existence, but the Tale-Teller refers to it here as “pretended philosophy.” Likewise, 
the Tale-Teller calls superficial conversation “wisdom.” We find it increasingly difficult to 
distinguish between “pretended philosophy” and this surface “wisdom,” since both are associated 
with the putting-on or maintenance of an appearance. The Tale-Teller’s love of mixing 
categories, upending conventional valuations to promote his own, becomes especially evident 
here. The difference between philosophical and superficial conversation, according to the Tale-
Teller, is that philosophy holds false pretensions to speaking deep truths, whereas superficial 
conversation is unpretentious in its aims. Strangely, this distinction between philosophy and 
conversational superficies rests on a distinction between truth and falsehood, one which we soon 
find to be entirely dubious. The Tale-Teller’s justification for calling “philosophy” a “pretended” 
discipline turns out to be his dislike of its conclusions, which he oversimplifies into the facile but 
evocative statement that “in the inside they [things] are good for nothing” (83). In other words, 
his evaluation of philosophy as a pretense rests entirely on his subjective definition of truth. 
Long before the rise of the telecommunications industry, Swift anticipates the popular appeal of 
the sound bite. 
The Tale-Teller accuses reason of distortion:  “Now I take all this [reason’s tendency to 
bare the ugly truth] to be the last degree of perverting Nature, one of whose eternal laws it is to 
put her best furniture forward” (83). The Tale-Teller accuses “Nature” itself of bias in its rule “to 
put her best furniture forward.” We begin to wonder what the Tale-Teller means at all by 




how human reason becomes an expression of human subjectivity. The Tale-Teller begins with a 
premise that is no more than his starting bias, and his categories and values engage in a 
constantly shifting landscape, such that upon closer inspection, he seems to be doing no more 
than writing about madness all along, even when he claims to write about reason. His 
descriptions of reason become increasingly difficult to distinguish from his descriptions of 
madness. 
We can understand Swift to be insinuating several different things simultaneously: that 
human reason is a poor excuse for reason, being prone to self-serving bias; and resembles a form 
of madness according to Swift’s understanding. Swift suggests that reason itself, being opposed 
to any form of subjectivity, is often antithetical to human interests and experiences.  
The ironies in the Tale-Teller’s statement are manifold: there is the Tale-Teller’s 
argument for the irony of philosophy, which claims to uncover the truth but seems to be as 
subjective as a grumpy grandfather in its assessment of the world (“inside they are good for 
nothing”) and in posing its assessment as the rationally discovered truth rather than a mirror of 
its subjective attitudes. However, we must also be wary of the Truth-Teller’s own tendency to 
bias, and cannot help but notice the irony of the Tale-Teller warning us against the whims of 
philosophy when he admits to a soft spot for madness and is himself guilty of many counts of 
subjective distortions which he accuses in others. Of course, there is the ever-present irony of the 
Tale-Teller’s efforts to make a rational argument for the benefits of madness.  Based on his own 
standards – his definition of philosophy as a pretense and the preferability of superficial 
discussions - the Tale-Teller would be better served by engaging in an argument for reason 
(since his duty ought not be to expose the truth as he understands it, but to maintain “credulity”). 




difficulty derives from his rapid shifting in values. After spending a substantial amount of time 
detailing the many disadvantages of reason and sanity and criticizing the conclusions of 
philosophy as a pretense, the Tale-Teller writes that “in such conclusions as these reason is 
certainly in the right” (speaking in reference to the philosophical conclusion that the insides of 
things are “good for nothing”). This sudden reversion to apparent agreement with the voice of 
reason is all the odder for the fact that what follows (a coolly described flaying) is scarcely 
concordant with our conception of a reasonable mind. 
Mad though the Tale-Teller might be, his portrait of the world is sufficiently recognizable 
that we cannot entirely discount it. It is unlikely that Swift desires us to idolize reason. After all, 
we find that the Tale-Teller’s method of rational argument merely seems to be a refined or 
disguised expression of subjective attitudes. By this time, caught up in the cynicism of the Tale-
Teller, we may find ourselves succumbing to his suggestions. Swift thus uses his prose to test our 
ability to resist our subjective states. Ironically, we depend on a subjective mechanism to climb 
out of the Tale-Teller’s morass. That is, we depend on our feelings to resist the Tale-Teller’s 
arguments. Our instinctive desire for peace and the commonsensical values we have (that deep 
thought and rationality are good, and madness is bad) preserve us from falling into extreme 
despair.  
The Tale-Teller, ironically, does exactly what he condemns, seeking to expose the errors 
of rationality by showing us why the truth is “good for nothing” (83). He works to reveal the 
defects of human reason and to mangle conventional morality with his topsy-turvy values. Even 
as he intrudes upon our equanimity with his grotesque illustrations, he upbraids reason for 
“officiously” offering its discoveries, “with tools for cutting, and opening, and mangling, and 




exposition, the Tale-Teller says that “in such conclusions as these reason is certainly in the 
right.” It takes us a while to realize what he means: that philosophy is at its best when it tries to 
maintain false appearances rather than supporting reason in its inquiry of truth. 
Swift takes his provocations to a climax in the passage where the Tale-Teller discusses a 
woman being flayed: 
And therefore, in order to save the charges of all such expensive anatomy for the time to 
come, I do here think fit to inform the reader that in such conclusions as these reason is 
certainly in the right; and that in most corporeal beings which have fallen under my 
cognisance, the outside hath been infinitely preferable to the in, whereof I have been further 
convinced from some late experiments. Last week I saw a woman flayed, and you will hardly 
believe how much it altered her person for the worse.  Yesterday I ordered the carcass of a 
beau to be stripped in my presence, when we were all amazed to find so many unsuspected 
faults under one suit of clothes.  (84) 
 
A sign of the Tale-Teller’s peculiarity is his imbalanced sense of scale, his tendency to 
commingle trivial aims with grand ones. Where previously he speaks of “steams from dunghills” 
as being on equal footing with “mists [which] arise from the earth” (78), the Tale-Teller now 
ventures to issue a grand affirmation of “reason” so that he can “save the charges of all such 
expensive anatomy” (84). The Tale-Teller rather absurdly declares the benefit of philosophical 
questions for economical thrift. Swift thus slyly pokes fun at the usefulness of philosophy, 
insinuating that regardless of their self-importance, at best philosophers can only hope that their 
discoveries will save the world some money. The Tale-Teller proceeds to make an obvious-
sounding statement with pedantic self-importance, writing, “I do here think fit to inform the 
reader that in such conclusions as these reason is certainly in the right.” Swift ridicules the 
opinions of such modern philosophers as faddish, whose tendency to vary their views over time 
is not too far removed from the deviations of madmen. Contrary to the Tale-Teller’s assertion 
that “in such conclusions as these, reason is certainly in the right”(84), we know that all rigorous 




Tale-Teller then follows this affirmation of reason with a very unreasonable statement: “in most 
corporeal beings which have fallen under my cognisance, the outside hath been infinitely 
preferable to the in” (84). The proof, the Tale-Teller explains, lies in the surgical theater. 
Michael DePorte remarks that the discussion of the flaying exposes the Tale-Teller to be a 
disingenuous writer who simply exchanges one set of superficial judgments for another. I would 
like to refine that further and argue that Swift uses this episode to call our attention to the 
disingenuousness of many a theoretical writer, but also to specifically invoke our common sense. 
With this passage, Swift establishes the highest tension between common sense and the Tale-
Teller’s logic, as well as the most dramatic shifts in tone. The Tale-Teller, in speaking of his own 
understanding of humanity, draws on unusual Latinate diction (“corporeal beings,” 
“cognizance,” 84). Through the stylistically idiosyncratic prose of the Tale-Teller, Swift 
dramatizes the way in which abstraction distances the theorist from the rest of humanity with 
terrible consequences. In referring to people as “corporeal beings” with the capacity to further 
his “cognizance,” the Tale-Teller strives to distinguish himself from the people he is studying 
and presumably attempting to assist. Swift suggests that this studied aloofness is a form of 
pretension.  
The Tale-Teller then abruptly switches from the high Latinate diction to mundane words 
that shockingly belie the horrific images he describes: “Last week I saw a woman flayed, and 
you will hardly believe how much it altered her person for the worse” (84). Swift suggests that 
the Tale-Teller does not even require the distancing tool of theoretical language to remove 
himself from emotional involvement with his subjects. The Tale-Teller, even in the language of 
everyday conversation, has attained the epitome of detachment from humanity. His words betray 




that theorists risk incurring in their eagerness to prove the ingenuity of their arguments. The 
reader can immediately recognize the hideous deformity in perspective that could lead a person 
to calmly watch another human being undergo torture as an intellectual exercise and refer to it 
afterwards as “some late experiments” (84) that support his point. Rather than commenting on 
the more pertinent fact of the inhumanity of these “experiments,” the Tale-Teller makes the 
observation that “you will hardly believe how much it altered her person for the worse” (84). 
Swift deliberately uses these clearly erroneous arguments to prod the reader into actively 
questioning the assumptions behind theoretical writing. He suggests that truth is more closely 
allied with values rather than a set of human procedures or exercises. The Tale-Teller’s errors in 
logic are closely tied to his incapacity for sympathy. In turn, this incapacity for sympathy is tied 
to his deviant subjectivity. He argues against flaying, not because it is a cruel and wrong thing to 
do, but because by revealing the gruesome interior of the human body, it fails to yield him 
pleasurable profit. 
The Tale-Teller’s theories can have the effect of infecting the reader’s consciousness. 
Ironically, rather than stemming the tide of madness, the Tale-Teller’s treatise tends to rouse new 
anxieties and doubts. His discussion of the flaying, while shocking and extremely distasteful, has 
a kind of internal coherence to its argument that occasionally lends it the semblance of sound 
conviction.  
Where mere sentences before the Tale-Teller condemns reason and philosophy for 
presenting a distorted picture of Nature, he now declares it the proper aim of philosophy as “an 
art to sodder and patch up the flaws and imperfections of Nature” (84). At first, we might be 
tempted to discount the Tale-Teller completely – surely it is not Nature which needs amending, 




dressed by his imagination. Certainly, the Tale-Teller is looking in the wrong place if he desires 
to know the true appearance of human nature, and his condemnation of typical philosophical 
methods of inquiry is unfounded on that account. However, we cannot help but agree that there is 
some truth to the Tale-Teller’s assertion of the “flaws and imperfections of Nature” (84). In our 
agreement with his notions, however slight, we find it impossible to distance ourselves 
completely from the Tale-Teller and his madness. 
And he whose fortunes and dispositions have placed him in a convenient station to enjoy the 
fruits of this noble art, he that can with Epicurus content his ideas with the films and images 
that fly off upon his senses from the superfices of things, such a man, truly wise, creams off 
Nature, leaving the sour and the dregs for philosophy and reason to lap up.  This is the 
sublime and refined point of felicity called the possession of being well-deceived, the serene 
peaceful state of being a fool among knaves. (84) 
 
In this passage, we can discern a Swift who appears to consider everything besides the moral 
truth to be a sham, such that one’s sensory experience are mere “films and images that fly off 
upon his senses from the superficies of things,” a form of hallucination which does not relate to 
the truth. The Tale-Teller associates the unvarnished truth with unhappiness and human thought, 
referring to it as “the sour and the dregs for philosophy and reason to lap up” (84). As is his style, 
Swift chooses to use distasteful imagery to ridicule the over-reliance of learned writing on 
metaphors and reductive physical models to provide explanatory power. In presenting us with 
such a manifestly reductive images as “the sour and dregs” to describe reason, Swift relies on the 
reader to exercise her common sense to resist the Tale-Teller’s subjective pronouncements.  
 The Tale-Teller opposes the mainstream view. He defines “the sublime and refined point 
of felicity” as “the possession of being well-deceived,” a triumphant point for the Tale-Teller, 
who desires no more than to prove that the crux of human experience is madness, that we are all 
mad in some way. Simultaneously, we also sense a Swift who wishes to expose human 




experience as truth. Swift and the Tale-Teller are not totally opposed in their conclusions: both 
desire to prove the subjectivity of human existence. Swift is no figure of benevolent authority; he 
is deeply involving, his irony engages the affect and is not easy to disentangle –we are never 
entirely sure if the enthusiasm for offense belongs to the Tale-Teller or Swift.  
Swift confronts us with a truly perplexing paradox when he writes of the man who lives upon 
the “superficies of things” as enjoying “the serene peaceful state of being a fool among knaves” 
(84). The critic Robert C. Elliott writes that in this moment “Swift has momentarily tossed the 
Tale-teller aside, speaking out in his own voice” (129). However, I argue that no simple formula 
for segregating meaning can be satisfactorily applied. Conceivably, “fool” is the Tale-Teller’s 
own word of praise for the man who knows to prize his “tinsel” and appreciates the delights of 
being “dupe” to his senses (83) Even if we do interpret the “fool among knaves” to be a literal 
expression and intrusion of Swift’s own sentiments, its suddenness takes us by surprise. We 
scarcely expect to see Swift appear here of all places, when the Tale-Teller has been building up 
the momentum for the triumphant moment in his praise of folly. If we do perceive Swift, then he 
appears more as a fleeting hallucinatory suggestion than a concrete authorial presence. In finding 
ourselves unable to refute the Tale-Teller’s wit, we feel as though in this instance, madness is in 
the right. The critic C.J. Rawson writes, “We cannot be sure of the nature of any saving 
alternative, and may even uneasily suspect that we are in a fool’s ‘Serene Peaceful State’ for 
imagining that such alternatives exist” (41). We are left grappling with the unsettling sensation 
of being included in Swift’s disapproval, no matter our affiliation. 
Swift puts us into the uncomfortable position of making a judgment without the solace of 
feeling that we are right. In the same sentence, we hear praise and condemnation of the 




surface wisdom nonetheless makes him “a fool among knaves” (84). The reader is never 
permitted to feel complacent about her moral condition. The note of antagonism is generated by 
the perverse juxtaposition of concepts: felicity with delusion, serenity and peace with 
foolishness. In presenting such extreme, distasteful polarities, Swift parodies impartiality as an 
enthusiasm for every kind of blemish in the world; and hence, a perverse form of subjectivity 
(instead of truly rational objectivity that considers all sides) that delights in what others revolt at.  
In various other works, Swift asserts certain values, of which the belief in the Christian God 
is one. However, he also presents the shocking alternatives. We can use Swift’s sermons as a 
rough guide to some of the norms that underpin his sense of satire. In Swift’s sermon “On the 
Trinity,” he distills the ultimate question of existence into a binary choice: 
We must either believe what God directly commands us in Holy Scripture, or we must 
wholly reject the Scripture, and the Christian religion which we pretend to profess. But this, I 
hope, is too desperate a step for any of us to make. 
Though it is clear which of these choices we are expected to make (for the latter, Swift 
comments, “is too desperate a step”), he nonetheless cannot resist indulging in the thought of the 
wicked course of action. The implications of the immoral alternative are too interesting to let 
altogether alone. Oddly enough, the length of the “either-or” sentence is weighted to the latter 
half, which considers rejection of “the Christian religion.” Swift spends slightly longer than 
necessary to outline the alternative, presumably undesirable course of action. Rather than simply 
ending at “reject[ing] the Scripture,” Swift goes on to add “and the Christian religion which we 
pretend to profess.” Although the “either-or” syntax initially appears to suggest the presentation 
of two equal options, what it really offers here is the doctrinally accepted truth in Christianity 
versus the shocking, and therefore much more interesting, alternative of rejecting the Christian 




Swift’s volatile style. Rather than providing reassurance, however, Swift merely remarks, “But 
this, I hope, is too desperate a step for any of us to make.” Characteristically, he compresses 
large questions into a concept or word to facilitate these rapid transitions, abbreviating the 
problem of faith into a single pronoun, “this.” Swift’s style dramatizes moral choice through his 
intense evocation of the anxieties attached to the question. Even in the non-ironic context of his 
sermons, the dark side lingers as a very present and potent danger which the reader is left to 
refute on her own.  
For all of his vexing propositions, Swift nonetheless had a very conventional objective in 
mind. In an “Apology” later published to preface the Tale, Swift writes, “[The Tale] celebrates 
the Church of England as the most perfect of all others in discipline and doctrine; it advances no 
opinion they reject, nor condemns any they receive” (2). Quintana notes that “Swift was a 
moralist before everything else, and it is a moralist who has here been admonishing us to accept 
the known realities and to live by these and not by the mere appearances of things – distortions 
of reality – however seductive” (16). To be a moralist is also to profess in certain values. 
Accordingly, Swift had a rigorous notion of Christianity and its scriptures as a deep form of truth 
that repudiates the superficial, morally corrupt arguments of humanity. Swift asserts the 
existence of an absolute reality independent of human judgment. In “On the Trinity,” he writes: 
Reason itself is true and just, but the reason of every particular man is weak and 
wavering, perpetually swayed and turned by his interests, his passions, and his vices. Let 
any man but consider, when he hath a controversy with another, although his cause be 
ever so unjust, although the world be against him, how blinded he is by the love of 
himself, to believe that right is wrong, and wrong is right, when it maketh for his own 
advantage. Where is then the right use of his reason, which he so much boasts of, and 
which he would blasphemously set up to control the commands of the Almighty? 
Swift distinguishes between “Reason” and “the reason of every particular man” in such a way as 




of the truth of “Reason itself,” Swift invokes both senses of “true” to denote faithfulness and 
verity, qualities that characterize the Christian God. Swift denounces “the reason of every 
particular man” as being permanently skewed by the moral corruption of human nature. Swift’s 
description of human reason contrasts it to the divine qualities of “Reason itself” (“true and 
just”). The only constant in human reason is its inconstancy, for it is “weak and wavering, 
perpetually swayed and turned by his interests, his passions, and his vices.” Swift describes the 
motivating “cause” of human interest as being “unjust.” To complete the contrast, Swift 
demonstrates that the convictions of humanity are manifestly false, since the average person is 
“blinded…by the love of himself” into believing “that right is wrong, and wrong is right.” [This 
description suggests that the average person cannot access “Reason itself” at all, for “Reason 
itself,” “true and just,” is as unattainable in its purity as the deity it resembles.]   
Swift insists on the sacredness of the doctrine of the Trinity as a divine mystery: 
And therefore many divines, who thought fit to answer those wicked books, have been 
mistaken too, by answering fools in their folly; and endeavouring to explain a mystery, 
which God intended to keep secret from us. And, as I would exhort all men to avoid 
reading those wicked books written against this doctrine [of the Trinity], as dangerous 
and pernicious; so I think they may omit the answers, as unnecessary. This I confess will 
probably affect but few or none among the generality of our congregations, who do not 
much trouble themselves with books, at least of this kind. However, many who do not 
read themselves, are seduced by others that do; and thus become unbelievers upon trust 
and at second-hand 
Swift’s hostility towards human systems of explanation arises from a certain kind of animosity 
towards those who believe they are acquainted with God’s mysteries. For Swift, “endeavouring 
to explain a mystery, which God intended to keep secret from us,” represents a supreme example 
of human “fools in their folly.” In essence, Swift suggests that truth itself constitutes the ultimate 
divine mystery. That is, all divinely ordained mysteries are true and remain unknowable to the 




according to Swift, to think otherwise, or to imagine ourselves capable of insight into such 
matters, is to be guilty of the most severe instance of hubris, of thinking that we are perfect 
enough to judge rightly. In Swift, the capacity for acquiring knowledge and “the right use of his 
reason” is directly linked to the purity of one’s moral nature. Earlier in the sermon, Swift argues 
that human reason is blighted by “his interests, his passions, and his vices.” For Swift, the 
greatest obstacle to knowing the objective truth is human subjectivity, which is inherent to 
human nature in the form of immoral self-interest and desire. Our resulting inability to see the 
truth for what it is leads to ignorance, or worse, madness, which in Swift is the lack of insight 
into our state of moral degradation. Swift’s reasoning might be approximated as follows: To 
think we are acquainted with the truths instituted by God is to think that we have perfect use of 
reason and are as free of sinful bias as God, such that we are able to understand his divine 
mysteries.  
The problem of how one might be able to acquire true knowledge at all in the midst of 
this moral degradation remains unresolved and a continual source of vexation in Swift. He 
condemns bodies of writings that seek to “explain a mystery, which God intended to keep secret 
from us,” as “wicked books,” “dangerous and pernicious.” He cites an additional instance of the 
evil done by these books: “many who do not read themselves, are seduced by others that do; and 
thus become unbelievers upon trust and at second-hand.” In Swift, ignorance compounds and 
reproduces ignorance. Human arguments are accepted as irrationally as they are made. But then 
again, Swift’s vision takes irrationality to be the defining feature of the human condition. 
In this chapter, I have argued that Swift uses madness to depict the estrangement of the 
solitary mind from common life. The treatise form is parodied, its formal style and systems 




Concerning Madness.” The diagnostic language of the treatise becomes the vector by which 
madness spreads its invidious influence. Irrationality is depicted as a cacophony of dissent, 
where each mind sings a different tune. Ultimately, Swift suggests that the isolation of the 
learned mind in its theoretical pitch cannot be overcome, such that the best that we can do is 
tolerate each other, to “give some allowance to the author’s spleen and short fits or intervals of 






The Common Life Cure for Madness: David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature 
 
Hume’s answer to Swift’s paradox: Introduction 
In “A Digression Concerning Madness,” Jonathan Swift assumes that the passions divide 
minds. Subjective experience, in the form of passion, colors our ways of thinking such that we 
can never accurately perceive the objective truth. For Swift, this realization of the inescapable 
subjectivity of the human condition leads to a crisis: we can choose to be optimistic fools or 
smart-aleck, jaded knaves. Either way, we are doomed to live a lie of our mind’s making. The 
knavish philosopher who realizes that we are all irrational in some sense then concludes that the 
best we can do is pick which kind of madness to go along with. And indeed, that is what Swift’s 
Tale-Teller does at the end of his treatise. 
The philosopher David Hume had most certainly read and enjoyed Swift. Writing of 
Swift’s style, he pays him the backhanded compliment of calling him one “whom I can often 
laugh with, whose style I can even approve, but surely can never admire. It has no harmony, no 
eloquence, no ornament, and not much correctness” (114). Hume perceives a failure in Swift to 
balance argument with appropriate sentiment. The lack of stylistic “harmony” threatens to 
generate further discord by provoking a cacophony of passions. The kind of laughter which Swift 
inspires is not the bonhomie of the backgammon table, but the peevish outburst of a volatile 
temper. Hume writes that “Nothing can be more entertaining on this head than Dr. Swift, an 
author, who has more humour than knowledge, more taste than judgment, and more spleen, 
prejudice, and passion than any of these qualities” (112). For Hume, Swift exemplifies how 




deal in ridicule and satire. What will posterity, for instance, infer from this passage of Dr. Swift 
[from Gulliver’s Travels]? (113). Hume suggests that satire threatens to break language as a 
means of authentic, sympathetic communication. He comments that Swift’s satire is “carry’d to 
extremes” (113), suggesting that Swift’s writing is dangerous because it threatens to overturn 
that delicate mental balance and moderation of sentiment which we call sanity. As we shall see, 
Hume’s crisis centers on negotiating this balancing act of the mind. 
A moment of crisis similar to that in Swift’s “Digression” occurs in the conclusion to 
Book 1 of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature. To paraphrase the Swiftian paradox in Humean 
terms, Swift’s choice of fools and knaves is a choice between common life and skepticism. The 
vast majority of the world falls under Swift’s category of the fool, being disinclined to question 
the reliability of human reason and quite content with the wisdom of common life. By contrast, 
the skeptic, who corresponds to Swift’s knave, has examined the nature of human reason, found 
it lacking, and promptly declares all intellectual labor to be futile. Thus, after examining the basis 
of belief and finding that “all probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation” (1.3.8, 
72), Hume is driven to the realization that “We have, therefore, no choice left but betwixt a false 
reason and none at all” (1.4.7, 174).  
However, from this point on, Hume’s account of the mind diverges from that of Swift. 
Whereas Swift leaves the reader to consign herself to her doom, Hume seriously takes up the 
question of how we can live with that choice as social, thinking beings. The Humean philosopher 
acknowledges the failure of human reason, but he also goes on to affirm the legitimacy of the 
passions of common life. Whereas Swift declares the passions to be subjective and therefore lies, 
Hume affirms the passions to be “original existence[s]” (2.3.3, 266) in their own right - not lies, 




condemn, human experience. Rather, the passions unify our minds, giving rise to a form of 
shared reality that anchors us. 
The Humean philosopher recognizes her extreme skepticism to be the influence of 
passion. This recognition frees her to move on from her despair, which she recognizes to be a 
momentary condition which will give way to other passions. In this way, she resolves her 
skeptical despair. Simply by joining her friends at the dining or backgammon table, the Humean 
philosopher finds that her former sensations of despair dissipate. Hume gives a name to this 
influence on the passions by physical proximity: the principle of sympathy. Conviction is simply 
the propensity or the effect of passions, and no more. Therefore when the philosopher finds 
herself at odds with the common view, she simply joins some companions for a meal or a game 
of backgammon, and the principle of sympathy ensures that the proximity to these jolly 
companions will release her from her despairing skepticism. 
Hume ultimately finds relief in common life, in social activity with his friends, and 
declares that no philosophy can be truly philosophical if it allows its skepticism to rise to such 
immoderate heights as to dispense with common life. A true lover of truth will not dismiss 
human experience as delusion, but recognize it to be an essential part of existence, and therefore 
a legitimate object of and contributor to philosophical inquiry. 
It is far from my intention to argue that Hume thinks “reason is entirely subservient to 
natural impulses” (Norton 219), as the Hume scholar David Fate Norton characterizes one 
extreme reading of the Treatise. Hume is most certainly a proponent of rational inquiry. 
However, that is not the same as saying that he advocates the mastery of reason above all. 
Rather, Hume redefines rational inquiry in his Treatise. He is quick to note the non-rational basis 




kind of mitigated rationalism, or mitigated irrationalism, if you will. Even if we as humans are 
fundamentally irrational in our way of thinking, we can still live reasonably. We can correct our 
beliefs as we uncover more of the truth in our reasoned inquiries. Likewise, we temper our 
reasoned skepticism with our passion for common life. Hume is very adamant on the point that 
reason is the discovery of a relationship between “truth and falsehood.” The philosopher who 
idolizes reason is as condemnable as the philosopher who abdicates all rational judgment. Such 
extreme skepticism indulges in the triumph of the solitary mind over the common life and 
becomes guilty of another kind of prejudice that is directed against humanity. Hume’s crisis in 
the Conclusion in Book 1 demonstrates just such a kind of dogmatic reason at work. 
However, Hume adds a complication to the equation. What we typically consider to be 
human reason, he shows, involves the activity of many parts of the mind. He focuses on three 
key components, which I will call the Humean trinity: reason, imagination, and the passions. 
Hume has a specific definition for each of these three parts, which will be discussed in further 
detail later. Notably, Hume considers reason to be primarily a fact-finding faculty: “Reason is the 
discovery of truth or falsehood…an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of 
ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact,” (3.1.1, 295). Of more interest to Hume are the less 
orthodox contributions to philosophy he discerns in the imagination and passions. 
In the conclusion to Book 1 of the Treatise, Hume describes the activity of the Humean 
trinity. The conclusions of one part inevitably affect the others, such that when he renounces his 
belief in belief, he finds himself assailed by the skeptical passions of fear, doubt, and resentment. 
Via the principle of sympathy, joining his companions for social activity dissipates his skeptical 
passions and former despair. By enabling the calibration of our passions to the common view, 




common life. Meanwhile, the passions of humility and curiosity, or the love of truth, work to 
mitigate his skepticism and guide his thoughts back to rational inquiry. The passions or 
“inclination” allow us to return to philosophy when the propensity strikes us. Thus, of the 
Humean trinity, the passions might be said to be the philosopher’s savior from extreme 
skepticism. Only by acknowledging the passions as the determinant of her convictions can the 
philosopher maintain a reasonable degree of skepticism in her inquiries and to be skeptical of her 
former, extreme skepticism. 
My goal here is to describe the parts of the Humean mind, but especially the passions, 
and to elaborate on the relationships amongst those parts; to trace the motions of those parts in 
the skeptical crisis in the Conclusion to Book 1, describe their volatility, and suggest ways in 
which Hume’s conception of the mind is not so stable; and examine more explicitly the role of 
the passions in resolving the skeptical crisis. I will attempt to develop a holistic interpretation of 
Hume, one which considers the Conclusion to Book 1 of the Treatise in relation to the other two 
Books of the Treatise. Specifically, I consider the application of Hume’s principle of sympathy 
to the resolution of his skeptical crisis in the Conclusion. The critic Donald Livingston suggests a 
version of Hume’s notion of sympathy, specifying its philosophical form as philosophical piety, 
or the conviction that “custom as a totality is sacred” (Livingston 38). I agree with this reading of 
Hume and will try to explain why the philosopher struggles to realize he is a participant in 
custom in the first place. I will then try to trace and account for the philosopher’s realization of 
belonging to custom and common life. 
Hume and His Critics 
The critical response to Hume’s Treatise has divided along what might be called Swiftian 




contemporaries, particularly that luminary of the Scottish school of Common Sense, Thomas 
Reid, charged him with purely destructive skepticism (Graham 2001). To the Common Sense 
school, who saw themselves as defenders of ordinary, normal thinking and therefore of 
rationality, Hume’s identification of flaws in human reason and his assertion of the role of the 
passions in morality threatened to undermine their sense of rational, divine order in the universe. 
Their thinking went something like this: Mankind, divinely mandated to rule the earth and all 
that is in it, must be equipped with adequate powers of judgment to carry out his task. Human 
nature must reflect the divinely ordained place of humanity in the universe. Reid, who belonged 
to the Common Sense school, therefore perceived Hume’s philosophy as a destructively 
skeptical one which gave a negative account of human reason. 
Credit for restituting Hume’s philosophy as a constructive effort and vision must go to 
Norman Kemp Smith. Most famously, Kemp Smith asserted, “what is central in Hume’s 
philosophy is his contention that reason ‘is and ought only to be’ the servant of the ‘passions’” 
(Kemp Smith v). In what has come to be known as the naturalistic interpretation of Hume, Kemp 
Smith argued that “natural belief takes the place of rational insight” (Kemp Smith 102) and 
“feeling has primacy over reason” (Kemp Smith 543). In contrast to the destructive skepticism 
which Reid perceived and objected to in the Treatise, Kemp Smith’s Hume did not abandon us to 
an irrational and therefore Godless universe. Rather, Kemp Smith’s Hume replaces reason with 
emotion as the infallible guide in matters philosophical and moral. 
 Subsequent interpretations have attempted to present a more balanced account of Hume’s 
philosophy. David Fate Norton specifically responds to Kemp Smith’s naturalism in a book 
whose subtitle sums up his understanding of Hume: Common-sense Moralist, Sceptical 




“two quite distinguishable philosophical crises, a speculative crisis and a moral crisis, or as may 
be preferable, in response to two kinds of skepticism, epistemological and moral” (Norton 304). 
Norton argues that Hume is a naturalist only in his conception of morality. That is, “morals and 
metaphysics have essentially different standards of truths” (Norton 310), such that 
Hume, although he readily acknowledges the importance of sentiment (in the form of 
natural or instinctive belief) as a guide in practical affairs, was not prepared to support the 
view that sentiment has, de jure or de facto, control in both practical and speculative 
affairs. (Norton 305) 
 
Norton thus describes a split in Hume’s philosophy along “practical and speculative” lines. 
 More recently, critics have considered the unity of Hume’s epistemology with his moral 
theory, seeing his account of metaphysics and morality as alike in being rooted in social-moral 
virtues. Donald Livingston and Annette Baier both identify a social-moral component to Hume’s 
conception of reason. Their positions suggest the impossibility of separating Hume’s moral ideas 
from his metaphysics. True philosophy takes the form of virtue. Specifically, Baier defines 
Humean reason thus in her 1991 book A Progress of Sentiments: 
Reason passed the test of reflection only when it became not just the lively love of truth, 
but also a moral virtue, only when it came to incorporate shared sentiments and a shared 
cooperative love of truth…Once true cooperative reason works for a sympathy-based 
moral sentiment, it prescribes fewer draconian laws and maxims, and avoids both tyranny 
and imbecility. (Baier 287-288) 
 
Baier lays out Hume’s very specific definition of the mental faculty of reason (not to be mistaken 
for Reason with a capital “R”): 
Hume’s Treatise campaign to show the limits of “reason,” to point up what it cannot do 
alone, was a campaign directed first against deductive reason or “demonstration,” then 
against a wider-ranging inferential reason that was limited to fact-finding, fact-relating 
and fact-predicting. This latter needs to “concur” with some motivating passion before it 
goes to work for any practical or evaluative purpose. (Baier 279) 
 
However, Baier plays down the role of the other passions, and of sympathy. She focuses on the 




Its [Reason’s] final status in the Treatise is as a very important natural virtue or 
ability…Reason joins the virtues, and may even be put high on the list. 
 It is, however, a transformed reason. It is accompanied by other abilities and 
virtues; it is answerable to the shared moral sentiment; it is itself a social capacity, both in 
its activities and in the standards of excellence by which they are judged. (Baier 280) 
 
Baier concludes that “the slave [reason]” is “a transformed reason” (Baier 280). In her final 
assessment of Hume, Baier writes that the Treatise “reestablished a transformed, active, 
socialized reason to a ‘likeness of rank, not to say equality’ with sovereign moral sentiment” 
(Baier 288). Similarly, Livingston suggests that Hume’s epistemology is related to his moral 
theory: “True philosophy, for Hume, is not only a mode of inquiry but a way of life, a form of 
wisdom” (Livingston xii). 
Likewise, both Baier and Livingston describe the Conclusion to Book 1 of Hume’s 
Treatise as a moment of transformation or conversion to the social world of common life. 
Livingston writes, 
Having recognized the magnificent and radiant order of participation in custom, 
philosophical speculation can never be the same. Henceforth, any return to the 
speculative moment must take account of oneself as a participant in custom. (Livingston 
37) 
 
Livingston’s tone is striking for its confidence that “philosophical speculation can never be the 
same” (37). Baier and Livingston present Hume’s skeptical crisis in the Conclusion to Book 1 as 
a largely resolved one. 
I agree with the broad outlines of Baier and Livingston’s interpretations of Hume’s 
Treatise. Likewise, I agree with their perception of a definite link between Hume’s metaphysics 
and his morality, as well as their recognizing Hume’s emphasis on common social life. However, 
I disagree that Hume’s philosopher is totally purified from further temptations to false 
philosophy following his conversion. Rather, the Humean mind remains susceptible to the same 




loyalty to common life, thereby uniting her love of common life with her love of truth. Her 
conversion does not preserve her from further struggle, but rather reveals to her the nature of 
virtuous philosophical struggle, which is shown to be continuous with the larger human struggle 
of the passions. The Humean philosopher realizes that her conflict is not one of reason against 
passion or common life, but one of competing passions within her own mind. It is not her 
faculties which have been transformed, but her loyalties. The Humean philosopher acknowledges 
her membership in common life, admitting to share in its struggles, and vows to return to 
common life when she finds herself drifting. No longer will the philosopher allow herself to 
indulge in a fit of misanthropy. The Humean philosopher recognizes herself to be equally human 
and not in a position of epistemological privilege to judge common life. 
Livingston traces the virtues of true philosophy. His portrayal of the outcome of 
conversion to true philosophy is highly optimistic. However, I argue that the conversion does not 
resolve all of the philosopher’s struggles. Rather, a key component of the conversion is the 
realization of the quality of that struggle. It is not that all struggles cease upon conversion, but 
that the philosopher finally sees clearly what her struggle is. Where previously, the philosopher 
imagines her struggle to be one of reason against passion, the converted philosopher realizes that 
the true conflict resides within her passions, and that she has mistaken passion for reason. 
Equipped with this understanding, the philosopher can more effectively carry out her 
investigations by learning to be skeptical of her reason. Nonetheless, if she should drop her 
vigilance, she risks falling back into the trap of false philosophy. In other words, the conversion 
is not a silver bullet against false philosophy, but merely a pledge of loyalty to common life, to 
defend it against philosophical dogma. At various times, the philosopher must struggle with 




risk of returning to the old, false way of philosophy. Even after her conversion, then, the 
philosopher must continually monitor herself and engage in self-correction. 
 
As will be evident later, Hume places great importance on the shared human experience. 
It is common experience which allows Hume to return from the despair of his skeptical crisis in 
the conclusion to Book 1. Our shared, or common, experience is part of the unitary human 
experience that constitutes the closest analogue we have to an objective reality or truth. Common 
experience also becomes the foundation for Hume’s morality. It is by entering into a “common 
view of things” that we can extract ourselves from our self-interested perspectives and 
participate fully in society. Hume emphasizes the harmony of rational thought with everyday 
wisdom, of which his discussion of geometry supplies one example: 
‘Tis true, mathematicians pretend they give an exact definition of a right line, when they 
say, it is the shortest way betwixt two points. But in the first place I observe, that this is 
more properly the discovery of one of the properties of a right line, than a just definition 
of it. For I ask any one, if upon mention of a right line he thinks not immediately on such 
a particular appearance, and if ‘tis not by accident only that he considers this property. 
(1.2.4, 37) 
 
Hume’s tone contains a shadow of Swift’s satiric bite when he writes that “mathematicians 
pretend they give an exact definition of a right line” (1.2.4, 37). In this analysis, Hume thus 
describes the insights of common wisdom as preceding the discoveries of rational inquiry. He 
also implies that desirability and attainability of a wide rational consensus, accessible to all. 
Notably, Hume writes to the populace, opting to use “common language” (1.3.8, 73) to articulate 
his philosophy, inexactness notwithstanding (for it is far better to express one’s inexact 
reasonings in a manifestly inexact language than to “pretend” to write with pure logical 





Swift is a perfectionist: the mere fact of our fundamentally irrational minds drives him 
into a frenzy of anxiety. Hume, by contrast, is pragmatically reconciliatory – he is concerned 
foremost with how we can persist in philosophical inquiry despite our irrationality, and in 
figuring out how we can be simultaneously engaged in common life and rational thought. If we 
are doing it right, our inquiries should be extensions of (rather than barriers to) common life. To 
put it another way, Hume seeks to unite the love of truth with a love of humanity. Hume wishes 
to separate philosophy from a dogmatic loyalty to the cold, passionless reason that drives the 
“demonstrative sciences.” As such, he exerts himself to enlarge our conception of philosophy 
beyond methodology and logical proof, emphasizing the role of the passions, imagination, and 
the social commons in philosophy. In her discussion of Hume’s conclusion to the first book of 
the Treatise, Baier argues that 
Hume enacts for us the turn he wants us to imitate, a turn from a one-sided reliance on 
intellect and its methods of proceeding to an attempt to use, in our philosophy, all the 
capacities of the human mind: memory, passion and sentiment as well as a chastened 
intellect. (Baier 1) 
 
Baier refers to “passion and sentiment.” The Humean mind readily receives the influence of the 
passions. However, the Humean passions are not to be confused with Kemp Smith’s feeling. 
Hume makes it very clear that he does not think we are motivated by simple “emotions”; when 
he speaks of the human passions and their central role in human behavior and thought, he refers 
to a range of influences that operate on the human mind. 
Hume desires people, but philosophers in particular, to engage the imagination and the 
passions in their thought, not merely the part which has typically been known as reason. Prior to 
conversion, the false philosopher dismisses the passions as a form of prejudice limited to 
common life, from which philosophy remains separate. However, Hume argues that true 




Humean philosopher recognizes that she has been under the influence of the passions all along, 
even when she thought herself to be guided by reason alone. Hume proposes that reason has been 
over-emphasized. Tellingly, he opens Part 4 of Book 1 with a section on “skepticism with regard 
to reason.” Ultimately, Hume wishes for us not to discard reason entirely, but to pursue truth in 
such a way as to ensure our continued involvement in common life, that we might not stray into 
the kind of modern learning detested and satirized by Swift, arcane and absurd. Hume wishes to 
wean aspiring philosophers from devotion to their own faculties of reason, and to become earnest 
lovers of truth. Hume warns against trusting in human reason too much: 
In all demonstrative sciences the rules are certain and infallible; but when we apply them, our 
fallible said uncertain faculties are very apt to depart from them, and fall into error. We must, 
therefore, in every reasoning form a new judgment, as a check or controul on our first 
judgment or belief; and must enlarge our view to comprehend a kind of history of all the 
instances, wherein our understanding has deceived us, compared with those, wherein its 
testimony was just and true. (1.4.1, 121) 
Hume therefore recommends constant vigilance in every step of the reasoning process. He 
writes, “we must, therefore, in every reasoning form a new judgment, as a check or control on 
our first judgment or belief” (121). Notably, he will also show that belief is the product of 
passion rather than logic. 
The Paradox of Reason and Belief 
In Book 1 of the Treatise, Hume writes, 
 
[The skeptic] cannot defend his reason by reason; and by the same rule he must assent to 
the principle concerning the existence of body, tho' he cannot pretend by any arguments 
of philosophy to maintain its veracity. Nature has not left this to his choice, and has 
doubtless esteem'd it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain 
reasonings and speculations. We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the 
existence of body? but 'tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? (1.4.2, 125, 
emphasis in the original) 
 
Hume identifies a fundamental paradox in philosophy that can be equally applied to the task of 




philosophy.” Indeed, Hume refers to such investigations as “uncertain reasonings and 
speculations” (Hume 125). Hume thus complicates conventional notions about objectivity and 
rational thinking. For Hume, philosophy appears to be not so much determining some objective, 
absolute truth as a rigorous inquiry into the foundations of our beliefs. Hume does not see human 
reason as equivalent to or capable of attaining the objective understanding that it ostensibly 
aspires to. To put it simply, human reason is not truth. Human reason is a flawed instrument of 
rational inquiry. One might say that human reason suffers from systematic error. 
Though Hume thinks our reason is flawed, that is not to say that he believes there is no 
objective reality at all that can be studied. Hume does leave room for speculation about the 
existence of an objective reality. Human reason cannot be “uncertain” unless there is a 
dimension of existence distinct from human experience. However, as far as human experience is 
concerned, Hume argues that we can never be fully certain of the “veracity” of our impressions, 
although we might be able to come to useful approximations. 
In light of this understanding of human reason, the explanation for why intellectual rigor 
does not necessarily lead to reason (in the sense of attaining a robust understanding of objective 
reality, of acquiring reasonable experience) becomes clear. In breaking down the relationship 
between human reason and truth, Hume exposes the mechanism by which human reason leads to 
madness. Like Swift, Hume takes human reasoning to be a faulty process, subject to the 
individual variations in experience. He writes,  
Our reason must be considered as a kind of cause, of which truth is the natural effect; but 
such-a-one as by the irruption of other causes, and by the inconstancy of our mental 
powers, may frequently be prevented. By this means all knowledge degenerates into 
probability; and this probability is greater or less, according to our experience of the 
veracity or deceitfulness of our understanding, and according to the simplicity or 





However, Hume differs from Swift in his understanding of the ultimate direction of human 
reason. Whereas Swift sees each person’s practice of reason as ultimately divergent from each 
other in idiosyncratic flights of madness, Hume sees human reason as converging on a form of 
radical skepticism. In a process exceedingly well-modeled by Swift’s Tale-Teller in “A 
Digression Concerning Madness” and Lennox’s Arabella in The Female Quixote, human 
reasoning leads to an understanding of the world that risks increasing deviation from reality.  
Taken to its utmost, human reasoning leads the philosopher to skepticism of the most destructive 
order. Book 1, in its reasoned investigation “Of the Understanding,” culminates in a moment of 
profound despair in Part 4. 
The Conclusion to Book 1 of Hume’s Treatise 
Hume’s philosophical despair follows on the heels of his declared resolution to undertake 
“a more close examination of our subject, and to proceed in the accurate anatomy of human 
nature, having fully explain’d the nature of our judgment and understanding” (1.4.6, 171). The 
sequence of events suggests that Hume believes true philosophy to be impossible without 
engaging the consciousness of the passions and the other parts of the subjective self, including 
memory and the imagination. In the conclusion to Book 1, Hume models for us the reflections of 
a truly skeptical philosopher. He uses language to describe his response to his philosophical 
conclusions: 
Methinks I am like a man, who having struck on many shoals, and having narrowly 
escaped shipwreck in passing a small frith, has yet the temerity to put out to sea in the 
same leaky weather-beaten vessel, and even carries his ambition so far as to think of 




Hume uses the imagery of a man in a boat tossed about by the sea, comparing his “forlorn 
solitude” to that of a “storm, which beats upon me from every side” (172). Hume’s nautical 
imagery, reminiscent of Biblical imagery of life’s trials, exalts philosophical melancholy.2  
Hume uses idioms and imagery drawn from the Christian idiom familiar to most of his readers to 
assist them in entering into his views. In doing so, Hume draws upon a kind of common 
language. His borrowed imagery underscores the desperation of the philosopher in the midst of 
his isolation. However, the pain of that isolation is critical for planting in Hume the desire to 
return to common life. This pain overwhelms him for the moment: 
My memory of past errors and perplexities, makes me diffident for the future. The 
wretched condition, weakness, and disorder of the faculties, I must employ in my 
enquiries, encrease my apprehensions. And the impossibility of amending or correcting 
these faculties, reduces me almost to despair, and makes me resolve to perish on the 
barren rock, on which I am at present, rather than venture myself upon that boundless 
ocean, which runs out into immensity. This sudden view of my danger strikes me with 
melancholy; and as it is usual for that passion, above all others, to indulge itself; I cannot 
forbear feeding my despair, with all those desponding reflections, which the present 
subject furnishes me with in such abundance. (1.4.7, 172) 
 
Hume deliberately uses language that merges the mental faculties, combining reasoning with 
memory and emotional response. He refers to the philosophical problems he encounters as 
“perplexities,” a word which registers both the cognitive and emotional aspects, signifying both 
intellectual challenge and the ensuing sensation of confusion. Hume suggests that such 
“weakness” of the mind does not condemn human reason as foolish, but only yields more cause 
for compassion. He attends to the natural response of his passions to his reasoned skepticism, 
speaking of his “melancholy,” “despair,” and desponding reflections” (172). Rather than 
                                                          
2
 “I cry out to you, God, but you do not answer; 
    I stand up, but you merely look at me. 
   You turn on me ruthlessly; 
    with the might of your hand you attack me. 
   You snatch me up and drive me before the wind; 





embracing this conclusion (that human belief depends on the imagination, that we may never be 
absolutely certain of the truth) as a triumphant discovery to his credit as a philosopher, Hume 
recoils, aghast at the irredeemable moral failure which he seems to have found: “And the 
impossibility of amending or correcting these faculties, reduces me almost to despair, and makes 
me resolve to perish on the barren rock” (171). Here we discover a key difference between Hume 
and Swift’s Tale-Teller: whereas the Tale-Teller delights in posing paradoxes condemning of 
humanity, in advancing theory for theory’s sake, and abandons us to our despair, Hume takes the 
view of advancing truth for humanity’s sake. Hume is ever conscious of truth as a profoundly 
human concern. His love of truth entails understanding it in relation to humanity. Thus, he 
speaks of this philosophical problem as a “danger” (172) to his tranquility. According to Hume, 
truth should never result in lasting alienation from common life (Baier 187). 
 For Hume, the greatest difficulty is not the impossibility of ascertaining the truth, but the 
ensuing despair and alienation from common life in which his skepticism places him: 
I am first affrighted and confounded with that forlorn solitude, in which I am placed in 
my philosophy, and fancy myself some strange uncouth monster, who not being able to 
mingle and unite in society, has been expelled all human commerce, and left utterly 
abandoned and disconsolate. Fain would I run into the crowd for shelter and warmth; but 
cannot prevail with myself to mix with such deformity. (1.4.7, 173) 
Although Hume does discern an antagonistic role for his imagination in relation to his peace of 
mind, observing that it causes him to “fancy myself some strange uncouth monster” (173), his 
imagination also serves to rein in his extreme (even pathological) skepticism. Whereas the Tale-
Teller’s imagination only makes his mind teem with distasteful imagery, Hume’s imagination 
gives him pause in his speculations by giving rise to a sense of self-awareness. He is able to take 
the common view of his condition and be skeptical of his skepticism only by the means of 




him from embarking on the kind of misanthropic condemnation of human reason that we have 
come to expect from Swift’s Tale-Teller. Instead, Hume’s fancy turns the lens of his awareness 
back onto himself. It is his fancy which enables him to take an external view of himself. Though 
this image of the self is undoubtedly imaginative and, factually speaking, not true (a 
philosopher’s speculations does not cause him to transform into a literal “monster,” and a 
sampling of portraits of Hume will not show him to be markedly different in appearance from his 
contemporaries), it permits him to take a step outside of himself to view his position more 
critically. This is the first step not only to rejoining common life, but also to a more moderate 
and therefore rational skepticism. 
The passion of humility lends its helpful, correcting influence. Hume’s description of 
humility in Book 2 bears a close correspondence to his crisis in Book 1. “The sensation of 
humility is uneasy” (2.1.5, 189), as Hume observes: 
the same house, still belonging to ourselves, produces humility, when by any accident its 
beauty is chang’d into deformity, and thereby the sensation of pleasure, which 
corresponded to pride, is transform’d into pain, which is related to humility (2.1.5, 189) 
 
Aided by the pains of humility, Hume perceives the “deformity” of his extreme skepticism. 
Finding himself “unable to mingle and unite in society” (1.4.7, 172), Hume considers an 
alternative that we might find familiar from reading Swift’s “Digression Concerning Madness”: 
he considers that he might “call upon others to join me, in order to make a company apart” 
(1.4.7, 172). However, he finds their response chastening: “no one will hearken to me. Everyone 
keeps at a distance” (172). Here we find a significant difference between Hume and Swift’s Tale-
Teller in their response to skeptical crisis.  Whereas the Tale-Teller could not care less about 
whether the rest of the world joins him, and is content with the knowledge of the truth of his own 




with that forlorn solitude, in which I am plac’d in my philosophy” (1.4.7, 172). Livingston 
describes this tendency of Hume as “the knowledge of ourselves as participants in custom” (37). 
 Nonetheless, this capacity for self-examination through “fancy” and humility does not 
immediately relieve Hume of his “melancholy” (172). Indeed, his reflections lead him to pity 
himself, pulling him deeper into despair and farther from the common view:  
I have expos’d myself to the enmity of all metaphysicians, logicians, mathematicians, and 
even theologians; and can I wonder at the insults I must suffer? I have declar’d my 
disapprobation of their systems; and can I be surpriz’d, if they shou’d express a hatred of 
mine and of mine person?  (1.4.7, 172) 
 
Humility or awareness of one’s defects is not curative, and indeed can become a form of egotism 
in its excessive focus on the sufferings of the self. Hume’s account gives a sense of the volatility 
of the human mind: no single faculty or any one virtuous passion (if we can, indeed, speak of 
virtuous passions, for Hume will later show that the passions cannot be said to be unreasonable) 
suffices to ensure his equanimity. Hume indeed explains in a later book of the Treatise that the 
passions are complicated, so it is not just the passion of the love of truth which saves him, but a 
multitude of “wheeling” passions (Baier 145) – a lifesaver, if you will, which allows him to float 
above the sea of his doubts. The complexity of Hume’s state cannot be overstated, for his self-
questioning is also evidently a form of self-doubt, one congenial to common life. However, a 
strain of pride and accusation (of others as well as self) runs through his speculations as well. 
Hume continues with his reflections in this complex mixture of passions: 
When I look abroad, I foresee on every side, dispute, contradiction, anger, calumny and 
detraction. When I turn my eye inward, I find nothing but doubt and ignorance. All the 
world conspires to oppose and contradict me; tho’ such is my weakness, that I feel all my 
opinions loosen and fall of themselves, when unsupported by the approbation of others. 
Every step I take is with hesitation, and every new reflection makes me dread an error 





This is the socially corrective mechanism that is missing from the Tale-Teller’s account of 
philosophy. For Hume, crisis ensues when the desire for common life (that is, shared experience) 
appears to be at odds with the philosophical passion for truth. The key conflict of the inquiring 
mind is not between reason and the imagination (though that is certainly a contributor to his 
unease) or even reason and passion, but between the social and skeptical impulses. His 
resentment, as evinced by his accusations of “anger, calumny and detraction” coming from “All 
the world,” is tempered by the “weakness” of his humility and loneliness, “unsupported by the 
approbation of others” (172). This humility with respect to his own mind expands into the 
awareness of sharing the same “infirmities” as the rest of humanity: 
For with what confidence can I venture upon such bold enterprizes, when beside those 
numberless infirmities peculiar to myself, I find so many which are common to human 
nature? (1.4.7, 172) 
 
As soon as he realizes that he shares in the common weakness of the human mind, he ceases to 
resent the world, and instead begins to examine himself. The passions of loneliness and humility 
thus spur him into a more rigorous mode of skepticism, one which undertakes to inquire into his 
own assumptions or philosophical beliefs. In this moment, Hume begins to reconcile the 
philosophical passion for truth and knowledge with the desire for common life. The consequence 
is a renewed passion for truth, evidenced by a more vigorous degree of self-questioning: 
Can I be sure, that in leaving all establish’d opinions I am following truth; and by what 
criterion shall I distinguish her, even if fortune shou’d at last guide me on her foot-steps? 
After the most accurate and exact of my reasonings, I can give no reason why I shou’d 
assent to it; and feel nothing but a strong propensity to consider objects strongly in that 
view, under which they appear to me. (1.4.7, 172) 
 
In this renewed vein of rational inquiry, Hume recognizes that his reasoned conviction is no 




skepticism is not necessarily “truth” (172). Hume begins to search for the basis of true 
knowledge. He asks, “by what criterion shall I distinguish her [truth]”? (172). 
Hume begins to inquire into the minute principles of belief formation, undertaking the 
kind of rational inquiry which he recommends as the right pursuit of philosophy: 
Experience is a principle, which instructs me in the several conjunctions of objects for the 
past. Habit is another principle, which determines me to expect the same for the future; 
and both of them conspiring to operate upon the imagination, make me form certain ideas 
in a more intense and lively manner, than others, which are not attended with the same 
advantages. Without this quality [of the imagination], by which the mind enlivens some 
ideas beyond others (which seemingly is so trivial, and so little founded upon reason) we 
cou’d never assent to any argument, nor carry our view beyond those few objects, which 
are present to our senses. (1.4.7, 172-173) 
 
Hume thus realizes that the basis of his newly reasoned skepticism is ultimately sentimental. He 
ventures to “assent” to his argument not because it is true, but because he feels it to be so, based 
on the “intense and lively manner” of its appearance and assisted by the imagination. Norton 
identifies this as an attack on imagination, but I would modify that assertion to say that Hume 
attacks the fundamental irrationality of reasoned belief, because founded upon the “quality” of 
the imagination. Hume’s cycle of self-questioning is driven by the painful passion of humility, 
pain to the self as object, and leads to the realization that we are little more than a series of 
impressions. The solitary philosopher is thus deprived even of the imaginative satisfaction of 
imagining himself as the Biblical hero who strikes out bravely “upon that boundless ocean” 
(1.4.7, 172) with which he begins this section, for he is no more than a “succession of 
perceptions, which constitutes our self or person” (173). 
Hume ushers in a new era of rational inquiry, when we acknowledge the essential 
influence of the traditionally rational and non-rational faculties working in tandem to facilitate 
our philosophical investigations. The question of truth, then, is not as much whether we ought to 




necessary and potent influences already working to shape our thinking. It is rather to what extent 
we should assent to or be guided by either. Hitherto we have too long emphasized the reign of 
reason. In doing so, we have neglected the contributions of the faculties which have 
conventionally been categorized as irrational, hence Hume’s strenuous efforts to define and 
establish the roles of imagination and the passions in rational inquiry. As we shall see later on, 
Hume determines a very specific and legitimate role for these faculties in rational inquiry. This 
trinity of the parts of Humean inquiry – reason, imagination, and the passions - is as complicated 
as the Christian theology from which Hume borrows his allusions. The Humean philosopher, by 
this reckoning, does not attempt to deny one part of the mind at the expense of the other parts, 
but rather endeavors to be as exact as he can in his investigations, acknowledging rather than 
disavowing those prevailing influences of common life, the imagination and the passions. It is 
not mistaken to say that Hume supports reason, but it is mistaken to argue that Hume 
subordinates instinct and feeling to it, if by “reason” we mean what Hume did, the faculty that is 
specific to demonstrative proof. 
I argue that Norton conflates Hume’s reason with the passion for truth, curiosity, when he 
writes that “reason itself is an instinct, and that those conclusions of reason that are believed are 
instinctive beliefs” (Norton 227). To his credit, Hume says that such errors are the sacrifice that 
we make when we write in the common language, which renders us prone to such confusions. 
Perhaps we might agree that Hume’s Treatise consists of an attempt to inaugurate a new mode of 
rational inquiry, one that reconciles our passions for common life with our philosophical passion 
of curiosity. To that end, the new Humean philosopher acknowledges her debt to all three parts 
of the Humean trinity - reason (in the strict Humean sense of demonstrative analysis), the 




the others. Reason as a mode of causal or analytical inference, then, is not to be confused with 
curiosity, the passion or “instinct” (Norton 227) for true knowledge. 
Norton’s summary of Hume’s philosophy assigns a central, “profound role” for reason. 
He writes, “[Hume] believes in the efficacy of reason even against the forces of nature and finds 
that even in its highest form, that is, in critical philosophy, reason has a profound role in human 
affairs” (Norton 20). It seems to me, however, that he does so at the expense of Hume’s own 
carefully modulated exposition of rational inquiry as laid out in the conclusion to Book 1. 
Contrary to Norton’s argument that Hume’s “epistemological” or “speculative crisis” is 
distinct from his “moral crisis” (Norton 304), I contend that the distinction between true and 
false philosophy rests on the moral desire for common life. Likewise, I differ from Norton in his 
view that 
Hume, though he readily acknowledges the importance of sentiment (in the form of 
natural or instinctive belief) as a guide in practical affairs, was not prepared to support the 
view that sentiment has, de jure or de facto, control in both practical and speculative 
affairs. (Norton 305) 
 
Sentiment, on the other hand, can motivate us and approbation and blame are themselves 
sentiments. However, these claims only establish the leading role of sentiment in morals, 
while leaving unanswered all questions regarding the standard of truth. (Norton 306) 
 
Norton’s claims, though laudable in their careful attempt to offer a more balanced view of 
sentiment and reason, nonetheless conflate the passion for truth with the demonstrative, 
analytical faculty of reason. As we know from the Conclusion to Book 1 of Hume’s Treatise, the 
passion for truth (to name just one of many philosophical passions) is crucial to the resolution of 
the “speculative crisis” (Norton 305). The rational or speculative faculties include sentiment, 
such that a speculative enterprise in the Humean manner must necessarily allow itself to be 
guided at times by “sentiment” or, to use Hume’s word, passion. To use the analogy of the 




the passions) all contribute to philosophical inquiry, and any one of the three parts may lead the 
others. Thus, Hume’s vision of rational inquiry is much more volatile than has hitherto been 
assumed or described by most of his interpreters. In Book 1, Hume writes, “We have command 
over our mind to a certain degree, but beyond that lose all empire over it” (1.3.14, 109). Rational 
inquiry does not advance by reason’s conquest of the imagination or passions. The Humean 
vessel is the same battered one as that which he sails in the Conclusion in Book 1, and the sea it 
sails is no less the stormy. 
 Thus, Hume asks, “How then shall we adjust those principles together?” (1.4.7, 173). I 
think that Hume’s subsequent account is an attempt to find that ideal equilibrium, to work 
through the passions via causal reasoning. Thus, rather than simply allowing sentiment to “take 
over the guiding role” (Baier 20), Hume actually engages both reason and sentiment when he 
writes, 
Nothing is more curiously enquired after by the mind of man, than the causes of every 
phenomenon; nor are we content with knowing the immediate causes, but push on our 
enquiries, till we arrive at the original and ultimate principle. We would not willingly 
stop before we are acquainted with that energy in the cause, by which it operates on its 
effect; that tie, which connects them together; and that efficacious quality, on which the 
tie depends. This is our aim in all our studies and reflections: And how must we be 
disappointed, when we learn, that this connexion, tie, or energy lies merely in ourselves, 
and is nothing but that determination of the mind, which is acquired by custom, and 
causes us to make a transition from an object to its usual attendant, and from the 
impression of one to the lively idea of the other? Such a discovery not only cuts off all 
hope of ever attaining satisfaction, but even prevents our very wishes; since it appears, 
that when we say we desire to know the ultimate and operating principle, as something, 
which resides in the external object, we either contradict ourselves, or talk without a 
meaning. (1.4.7, 173) 
 
Contrary to appearance, this passage is no mere emotional rant, but a rational examination of the 
passions. Hume describes the passions as a cause and effect of philosophical inquiry. The 
passion of curiosity motivates “the mind of man” to search for “the causes of every 




up the human understanding to its first principles” via causal reasoning, we find that our 
ostensibly rationally formed opinions are nothing but an effect of the passions and the 
imagination. This conclusion necessarily gives rise to the passions of humility, disappointment, 
and despair, and “discourage us from future enquiries” (173). 
By this account, passion precedes any sort of causal or demonstrative reasoning, even in 
philosophy. This is what Hume means when he writes that “reason is perfectly inert” (3.1.1, 294) 
– not that reason is utterly devoid of influence, but that it cannot be the ultimate, initiating 
influence. Thus, Hume’s statement of the role of reason must be taken to be an argument about 
“the original and ultimate principle” of human understanding. Reason can affect the passions and 
understanding, no doubt, but the “original and ultimate” impetus of this inquiry can only be the 
passion for truth. The phrase “original and ultimate” itself is peculiar, suggesting a mystery of 
origin and being analogous to that of the Christian God, who is called the Alpha and the Omega 
(first and the last) in the Book of Revelation. For Hume, this phrase captures what is at stake for 
the philosopher: the whole enterprise of philosophy is imperiled by the discovery that there are 
no cause and effects external to our mind. Instead, there is only “this connexion, tie, or energy 
[which] lies merely in ourselves” (1.4.7, 173). Causal reasoning is based upon nothing more than 
an impression, “that determination of the mind, which is acquir’d by custom, and causes us to 
make a transition from an object to its usual attendant, and from the impression of one to the 
lively idea of the other” (173). The perception of causal relationships is entirely artificial, based 
upon sentiment and impression. Causality is not at all an inherent property of the world we 
inhabit and observe, to the extent that we are capable of doing so. 
This finding leads Hume to spiral into despair: 
The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has 




reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another. 
Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition 
shall I return? Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings 
surround me? I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the 
most deplorable condition imaginable, inviron’d with the deepest darkness, and utterly 
depriv’d of the use of every member and faculty. (1.4.7, 175) 
 
Hume describes his extreme skepticism as an example of how it obstructs philosophy by 
discouraging him from answering these questions. His doubts overwhelm him; he is in a state of 
imagination and passion (“confounded,” “fancy,” “deplorable,” “depriv’d”) precipitated by the 
conclusions of his reason. Extreme skepticism is really a convenient shorthand for the process by 
which reason’s conclusions leads to annihilating doubt that alienates us from common life. Thus, 
skepticism results from a combined process of reason and passion. The “manifold contradictions 
and imperfections” revealed by his reason (i.e., his capacity for analyzing the relationships 
between facts) lead him to be “ready to reject all belief and reasoning” (175). This description of 
paralyzing despair and the doubts that have “heated my brain” (175) recalls the crisis that we 
came across earlier in Swift’s “Digression Concerning Madness. 
 In analyzing this moment of Hume’s skeptical crisis, we must be careful not to confuse 
doubt with curiosity, the virtuous philosophical passion. What is described here is most certainly 
debilitating doubt. Doubt annihilates any sense of understanding and denies common life, 
whereas curiosity spurs us on in our investigations, toward truth. Solitude has “heated my brain” 
(175), increasing the intensity of his doubting passion and further fired by his imagination. He 
begins to “fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, inviron’d with the deepest 
darkness, and utterly depriv’d of the use of every member and faculty” (175). The mind is cast 
into a state of absolute alienation from common life. In his “fancy” and physical reality, the 
philosopher is alone, “depriv’d” of any means of connection to common life. When the passion 




views of things” (1.4.7). Only when we assent to the influence of common life are we able to 
return to our philosophical investigations. 
The passions of common life save us from extreme or false skepticism, which is 
annihilative rather than revelatory.  By the principle of sympathy, our proximity to others in 
common life communicates their passion to our consciousness. These passions renew our 
common beliefs, the ones which mitigate our skeptical passions (the skeptical passions include 
doubt, confoundedness, and despair) and make philosophy possible. While reason condemns the 
qualities of the human mind, the passions and imagination strengthen the desire to “mingle and 
unite in society,” even as they prevent that mingling by convincing the philosopher of his social 
unfitness. Reason cannot help him out of his despair, for his reasoned skepticism is what prompts 
his sensations of alienation and condemns his condition. Hume laments that he “cannot prevail 
with myself to mix with such deformity.” His allusion to “deformity” leaves the object of its 
reference unclear (does he refer to his own monstrous thoughts, or to the character of the 
crowd?), thus dramatizing the incomplete awareness of the mind to the full effect of its 
imagination. 
In Hume’s account, the passions and the reflections which they prompt aid the aspirations 
of philosophy to truth-seeking by making him proceed “with hesitation” and teaching him to 
“dread an error and absurdity in my reasoning” (172). The passions, rather than inciting him to 
headless condemnation, rein in his faulty reasoning. His apprehensions help him to apply 
skepticism to his own reasoning. In this way, the Humean passions step forth as the 
philosopher’s savior from the pitfalls of excessive confidence and tyrannical insistence that Swift 
condemns in learned opinions. In the events leading up to Hume’s crisis, we can thus observe 




The Cure for the Philosopher’s Malady 
 
For Hume, the skeptical crisis proceeds from the fundamental qualities of the human 
mind – the imagination’s tendency to gain momentum in any fixed idea until it becomes a mad 
obsession, the mental commotion produced by the involuntary movements of the passions via the 
inviolable and automatic principles of association. If we are to continue philosophizing, we must 
do so in a way that is congenial to our nature and passions, satisfying both the love of truth and 
the desire for common life.  
Now that we see our reasoned conclusions to be merely relationships (of ideas), based 
upon passions and not necessarily facts, we ought to privilege one relationship above all: our 
relationship with others. The personification of passions and ideas in Hume’s vocabulary of 
thought reflects his deep investment in common life and the passions as conduit to that scene.  
The role of passion in philosophy extends beyond that of supplying the initial motivation. 
Hume emphasizes that belief is a function of passion: “belief is more properly an act of the 
sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures” (1.4.1, 123). We assent to an argument not 
because we know it to be true, but because we feel it to be true. The Humean philosopher 
realizes that our cause-and-effect relationships were merely sentimental (in the sense that they 
are founded upon the passions), much the way that our attachments to our community are 
sentimental. If we renounce common life, then we deny the very basis of rational inquiry. 
Moreover, leaving common life would be alienating ourselves from the most fundamental 
relationship of all. Common life, the shared experience or correspondence of passions between 
people, anchors us in a reality outside our immediate selves.  
Recognizing the passions as the “original and ultimate principle” of human understanding 




reasoned from observation is still as valid (or invalid) as before. This is not to say that Hume is 
advocating the abandonment of philosophy in favor of blind acceptance of common assumptions. 
Hume is very clear what such cessation of vigorous inquiry would lead to: “we must at last 
become asham’d of our credulity” (1.4.7, 174). Hume perceives the proper activity of philosophy 
to be inquiry into the assumptions of the world. The passion for truth is still very real and in 
operation. Rather, recognizing the fundamental basis of our rational inquiry in the passions 
allows us to be more clear-headed. We must realize that the relationships we perceive remain 
merely that, perceptions: not that there is no discoverable relation of cause and effect in the 
world, but that we cannot ever be certain of having fully determined that causal relationship, 
owing to the nature of human reason. Our mode of understanding does not permit us to perceive 
those relationships directly. The association of perceived causal relationships in our minds is 
entirely founded upon the passions and imagination rather than pure logic. Thus, perception does 
not necessarily mean observation. We cannot be sure that perceived causality extends beyond our 
perception or reflects the true nature of the world. This awareness of the precariousness of 
philosophy and human understanding is the true definition of skepticism in Hume’s books. The 
passions are not the undoer of reason, but the savior. Ultimately, it is the passion for truth and the 
desire for common life which saves us from the despair of extreme skepticism and permits us to 
resume our daily occupations. 
In one sense, Hume proceeds much like Swift’s Tale-Teller: he works his way through 
his theories, begins to reflect on the implications of his theory, and works himself into a state of 
anxiety. However, whereas Swift despairs of any cure for human depravity or madness, which he 
thought to be much the same, Hume does find a sort of cure for his maddening despair: 
Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, 




delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively 
impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of 
backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four 
hours’ amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, 
and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther. (175) 
 
Commentators have dismissed this passage as a cop-out, a refusal to give a rational account of 
how the skeptical crisis resolves, as Singer has observed (606). However, I argue that Hume’s 
account of the passions and the principle of sympathy is a reasoned explication of the processes 
that lead him out of his despair. Once he has been “merry with my friends” (175), his former 
passions of despair gradually pass under the influence of his company. Hume suggests that social 
gatherings allow a vital process of equilibration to occur, one which he calls by the principle of 
sympathy. The principle of sympathy is our primary means of accessing and responding to the 
shared reality of our passions. Notably, Hume believes that the principle of sympathy is an 
essential feature of human nature. When we interact with people, we cannot help being 
influenced by their passions. Passions from common life thus help steady and unite us via the 
principle of sympathy. By contrast, passions generated in response to the idiosyncratic ideas or 
“chimeras” of our reason and imagination tend to distance us from each other, leading to distress 
of the sort described in the Conclusion to Book 1. By the principle of sympathy and by 
reaffirming our ties to humanity and common life, the passions enable our recovery from the 
skeptical crisis. The converted Humean philosopher recognizes that her conclusions are based on 
passion, that the powers of judgment which she recognizes as reason is a flawed capability. 
Accordingly, she need no longer hold herself captive to her conclusions, but consider them to be 





 To return to philosophy, we simply wait for the propensity or passion to strike us again. 
Hume articulates his new philosophy thus: 
Nay if we are philosophers, it ought only to be upon sceptical principles, and from an 
inclination, which we feel to the employing ourselves after that manner. Where reason is 
lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does 
not, it never can have any title to operate upon us. (1.4.7, 176) 
For Hume, philosophy conducted “upon sceptical principles” (176) must acknowledge that its 
own beliefs are open to questioning. Armed with this new awareness of the weakness in our 
judgment, our new priority is to monitor for and correct any prejudices in our judgment in order 
to attain that common point of view. Here, all the parts of the Humean trinity come into play: we 
use our imagination to “enter with difficulty into remote views of things” (1.4.7) and “into 
sentiments, which in no way belong to us” (3.3.1, 376). The imagination and the passions enable 
us to transcend our prejudices. 
For Hume, the passions supply the material for a common reality. Hume indicates that 
skepticism, contrary to Swift’s characterizations of it as hubris, represents a supreme form of 
humility, casting the philosopher into the deepest wells of not only self-doubt, but also doubt of 
the power of human reason. Notably, Hume’s string of questions proceeds from the first-person 
to the social: “Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings surround 
me? And on whom have I any influence, or who have any influence on me?” The pain of 
humility turns the philosopher’s attention beyond himself, to the world of common life.  
The Passions 
Hume’s notion of the passions is far from one that portrays them as the primal drives that 
we typically take them to be. The Humean passion is not the same as a “simple emotion” (96). 
Rather, they are complex entities rooted in the circumstances of the world, such that we can 




“subject” (2.1.3, 185). What Hume means by passion is quite different from our contemporary 
sense of emotion. In the now familiar narrative of psychopathology that we have, madness is the 
result of passion overwhelming reason. According to this popular conception of madness, 
passion is the precursor to madness by virtue of its volatility and irrationality. Passions are 
primal, subjective, unthinking states in this account of the mind. By contrast, Hume argues that 
passions have an objective existence, and a complex one at that. In the hierarchy of perception 
that Hume establishes, the passions are “secondary and reflective” impressions, one rung higher 
than ideas. These passions provide the founding materials for common life. Hume writes,  
the passion, properly speaking, is not a simple emotion, but a compounded one, of a great 
number of weaker passions, deriv’d from a view of each part of the object…Thus a man, 
who desires a thousand pound, has in reality thousand or more desires, which uniting 
together, seem to make only one passion. (1.3.12, 96) 
 
Passions cannot be unreasonable because they are facts of existence rather than ideas to be 
contested: 
A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, a modification of existence, and 
contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or 
modification…’Tis impossible, therefore, that this passion can be oppos’d by, or be 
contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of 
ideas, consider’d as copies, with those objects, which they represent. (2.3.3, 266) 
 
Hume wishes to demolish the age-old trope of human psychology that the passions act contrary 
to reason. 
The passions can divide human minds, but for Hume they primarily provide the means of 
uniting minds via the principle of sympathy, by which the Humean philosopher returns to 
common life. In contrast, reason divides minds via the principle of comparison, which is 
“directly contrary to sympathy in its operation”. The link between comparison and reason is 
definitive in Hume’s account: “All kinds of reasoning consist in nothing but a comparison” 




worth and value…But no comparison is more obvious than that with ourselves” (3.3.2, 379). 
Thus, comparison does its dirty work by pitting the desire for pleasure against the desire for 
common life.  
Any kind of departure from common life carries dire consequences, according to Hume. 
It is undesirable in the most fundamental sense of going against our very nature, which he 
characterizes as having “the most ardent desire of society…We can form no wish, which has not 
a reference to society” (2.2.5, 234). Learning that is alienated from the desire for common life 
inevitably diverges from “the foundation of those moral rules concerning natural and civil 
justice” (364). When Hume writes, “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, 
and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” (2.3.3, 266), he means 
this: what does and ought to guide the will in philosophical inquiry or moral decisions is not 
reason, but rather the calm passions and the desire for common life. 
Hume writes, 
 Now it is certain, there are certain calm desires and tendencies, which, though they be 
real passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects 
than by the immediate feeling or sensation. These desires are of two kinds; either certain 
instincts originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the 
love of life, and kindness to children; or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, 
considered merely as such. When any of these passions are calm, and cause no disorder 
in the soul, they are very readily taken for the determinations of reason, and are supposed 
to proceed from the same faculty, with that, which judges of truth and falshood. (2.3.3, 
268) 
Hume describes human actions or the visible embodiment of what we traditionally call human 
will as the “effects” (268) of the passions. Hume’s understanding of human nature thus contains 
a large element of volatility in its attribution of human motivation to any number of passions that 
happen to make up the “general character or present disposition” (2.3.3, 268) of any individual at 




“general” way and hypothesize about the “present disposition” (268). No one reason, passion, or 
instinct accounts for human behavior. In that sense, our true motivation for doing anything will 
always remain somewhat mysterious and opaque to our understanding.  
The traditional struggle between reason and passion is really a struggle between the calm 
and violent passions: 
what makes this whole affair more uncertain, is, that a calm passion may easily be 
chang’d into a violent one, either by a change of temper, or of the circumstances and 
situation of the object, as by the borrowing of force from any attendant passion, by 
custom, or by exciting the imagination. Upon the whole, this struggle of passion and of 
reason, as it is called, diversifies human life, and makes men so different not only from 
each other, but also from themselves in different times. (Hume 2.3.8, 280) 
Hume implies here that the calm and violent passions give rise to a sort of volatility within the 
human mind – their existence “diversifies human life, and makes men so different not only from 
each other, but also from themselves in different times” (2.3.8, 280). 
In summing up the project of inquiring into passions and the continual competition 
between the calm and violent passions, Hume writes, 
Philosophy can only account for a few of the greater and more sensible events of this 
war; but must leave all the smaller and more delicate revolutions, as dependent on 
principles too fine and minute for her comprehension. (2.3.8, 280) 
The Humean trinity of the mind, once acknowledged, nonetheless resists being fully 
comprehended by its devotees. The Humean philosopher recognizes the limitations of reason and 
does not pretend to be able to explain all “principles” (280). 
Sympathy and the Passions: Sustaining Common Life 
Swift and Hume share a sense of the inadequacy of human reason alone. This is 
embodied for Hume in his philosophical despair at the Conclusion to Book 1; for Swift, 
represented by the Tale-Teller as treatise writer in his reasoned madness. Once departed from 




conversion, the philosopher fails to realize that her prejudice against common life is the fruit of a 
“warm imagination” (1.4.7, 177). As long as this is so, we will continue to follow the bent of our 
fancy and cultivate  
hypotheses embrac’d merely for being specious and agreeable, [and] we can never have 
any steady principles, nor any sentiments, which will suit with common practice and 
experience. (1.4.7, 177) 
 
If we persist in denying the influence of the passions and the imagination in our inquiries, then 
we undermine the intent of our whole philosophical enterprise. We have founded our convictions 
upon our whimsical notions without admitting it, opening ourselves up to faulty reasoning to the 
worst extent possible. If we don’t repent, we will end up like Swift’s Tale-Teller, condemned to 
the fires of our own judgment, hating all of humanity and incapable of leaving that state. The 
gospel that Hume wishes to spread amongst philosophers is the reality of the passions and the 
need for common life: 
I wish we cou’d communicate to our founders of systems, a share of this gross earthy 
mixture [of honest common folk], as an ingredient, which they commonly stand much in 
need of, and which wou’d serve to temper those fiery particles of which they are 
compos’d. (1.4.7, 177) 
 
Hume declares the aim of his reformed, converted philosophy: 
we might hope to establish a system or set of opinions, which if not true (for that, 
perhaps, is too much to be hoped for) might at least be satisfactory to the human mind, 
and might stand the test of the most critical examination.  (1.4.7, 177) 
 
Typically, he tempers even this ambition with a qualifying phrase, “we might hope” (177). 
Salvation from that dreaded state of doubt is by no means assured. However, we might at least 
hope to avoid some of the more egregious mistakes, and find sustenance and satisfaction in the 
natural pleasures of common life. 
Hume finds sympathy to be the crucial link between individual and common life. By 




“communication of sentiments and passions” (3.3.2, 378). For Hume, sympathy is an operation 
rather than a sentiment, one which permits us to engage in the same reality as others. Hume 
argues that the similarity of our minds facilitates a kind of sentimental affinity: 
We may begin with considering a-new the nature and force of sympathy. The minds of all 
men are similar in their feelings and operations; nor can any one be actuated by any 
affection, of which all others are not, in some degree, susceptible. As in strings equally 
wound up, the motion of one communicates itself to the rest; so all the affections readily 
pass from one person to another, and beget correspondent movements in every human 
creature. (3.3.1, 368) 
Hume’s analogies bear many resemblances to those of the Tale-Teller in Swift’s “A Digression 
Concerning Madness.” However, Swift is pessimistic, arguing that 
if you chance to jar the string among those who are either above or below your own 
height, instead of subscribing to your doctrine, they will tie you fast, call you mad, and 
feed you with bread and water. (Swift 81) 
 
Swift sees dissonance to be the more likely outcome. Whether there is “harmony of human 
understanding” depends entirely on whether the individuals share “the same tuning” (Swift 81) 
in the first place. Moreover, one’s pitch seems to be fixed. Should two individuals be discordant 
in their “tuning,” Swift seems to see little possibility of changing that. By contrast, Hume holds a 
much more optimistic view of humanity’s capacity for sympathy. For Hume, human minds 
operate sympathetically by default. Just as the physical nature of strings dictates that one 
vibration will initiate further vibrations in the next string, so does the sympathetic nature of 
human minds ensure the communicability of passions. 
Notably, sympathy engages not simply the passions, but also the rational faculties. Hume 
uses the surgical theater as an instance of sympathy in operation. He depicts the interaction of 
sympathy and reason as an organic and seamless transition: 
When I see the effects of passion in the voice and gesture of any person, my mind 




passion, as is presently converted into the passion itself. In like manner, when I perceive 
the causes of any emotion, my mind is conveyed to the effects, and is actuated with a like 
emotion. Were I present at any of the more terrible operations of surgery, it is certain, 
that even before it begun, the preparation of the instruments, the laying of the bandages in 
order, the heating of the irons, with all the signs of anxiety and concern in the patient and 
assistants, would have a great effect upon my mind, and excite the strongest sentiments of 
pity and terror. No passion of another discovers itself immediately to the mind. We are 
only sensible of its causes or effects. From these we infer the passion: And consequently 
these give rise to our sympathy. (3.3.1, 368) 
This passage also has important parallels to Swift’s example of the flayed woman in the 
“Digression,” with the key difference being that the Tale-Teller does not register any emotional 
involvement or observation. By contrast, Hume speaks of responding to “signs of anxiety and 
concern in the patient and assistants” with “the strongest sentiments of pity and terror.” 
However, this is not a simple instance of conditioned response. Hume emphasizes that sympathy 
is not a primitive reflex, nor is it even immediate. He writes, “No passion of another discovers 
itself immediately to the mind.” Nor is sympathy strictly confined to the emotions. Hume’s 
language blends thought and feeling, enacting the process that it describes. Of the passions, 
Hume writes, “We are only sensible of its causes or effects,” from which “we infer the passion.” 
In other words, sympathy requires the activity of reason. Sympathy, or emotional correlation, is 
guaranteed only by the similarity and consistency of human nature. Minds will agree only so far 
as they are similar in disposition. And even then, the natural tendency of the human mind is to 
diverge in sentiment and judgment: 
every particular person’s pleasure and interest being different, it is impossible men cou’d 
ever agree in their sentiments and judgments, unless they chose some common point of 
view, from which they might survey their object, and which might cause it to appear the 




It is only by active exertion that we become attuned to each other. Sympathy is acquired by 
effort. Hume’s solution to the partiality of humanity is to encourage us to be partial on the same 
terms by settling on a “common point of view” (377). 
 Hume remains optimistic that there is some possibility of correcting our partiality with 
experience: 
In general, all sentiments of blame or praise are variable, according to our situation of 
nearness or remoteness, with regard to the person blamed or praised, and according to the 
present disposition of our mind…Experience soon teaches us this method of correcting 
our sentiments, or at least, of correcting our language, where the sentiments are more 
stubborn and inalterable. (3.3.1, 372) 
 
Hume uses a very Swiftian example to support his argument for the importance of 
sympathy. Sympathy is essential to the upkeep of everyday life: 
A man will be mortified, if you tell him he has a stinking breath; though it is evidently no 
annoyance to himself. Our fancy easily changes its situation; and either surveying 
ourselves as we appear to others, or considering others as they feel themselves, we enter, 
by that means, into sentiments, which in no way belong to us, and in which nothing but 
sympathy is able to interest us. And this sympathy we sometimes carry so far, as even to 
be displeased with a quality commodious to us, merely because it displeases others, and 
makes us disagreeable in their eyes; though perhaps we never can have any interest in 
rendering ourselves agreeable to them. (3.3.1, 376) 
 
Hume’s mundane example suggests the importance of everyday life to him, a concern which 
Swift also shares. The underpinnings of common life fascinate Hume. In the face of so much 
uncertainty (about the unsound basis of our knowledge) as revealed by skeptical inquiry, how do 
we maintain any sense of stability or sanity? In the very ordinary case of a man with a “stinking 
breath,” Hume discerns an extraordinary shift or conformity of self-interest to common interest. 
For Hume, the first-person point of view is the most unstable of them all: 
When we form our judgments of persons, merely from the tendency of their characters to 
our own benefit, or to that of our friends, we find so many contradictions to our 
sentiments in society and conversation, and such an uncertainty from the incessant 
changes of our situation, that we seek some other standard of merit and demerit, which 





Hume finds the self-interested point of view full of the same kinds of “contradictions,” 
“uncertainty,” and “incessant changes” enacted by Swift’s Tale-Teller. Hume suggests that some 
degree of selfless generosity is necessary for our own peace of mind. According to Hume’s 
optimistic vision, our individual desire for psychological stability coincides with the community 
need for harmony. We have an incentive to remove ourselves from our own “peculiar” positions 
(371) and acquire a common point of view. Hume argues that we are rationally and sentimentally 
motivated to seek common ground. He thus equates sanity with common life. The sane person is 
not just one in full possession of his reasoning powers, for we have seen that human reason is 
forever misguided by self-interest. Rather, we must strive to attain that common point of view 
which enables our mental poise. To renounce common life is to risk entering a mental territory 
fraught with dangerous “variation” (373). Fortunately, we are assisted in our efforts to align 
ourselves with the common view by the sociable inclination of our nature. 
 Hume sees the human mind as being primarily defined by its affinity for other minds. So 
deep and natural to us is this connection that the mind as we know it cannot exist in isolation: 
We can form no wish, which has not a reference to society. A perfect solitude is, perhaps, 
the greatest punishment we can suffer. Every pleasure languishes when enjoy’d apart 
from company, and every pain becomes more cruel and intolerable. (2.2.5, 234) 
 
Hume’s affirmation of social life, with its references to the misery of a “perfect solitude” (234) 
carries within it lingering memories of the painful crisis in the Conclusion to Book 1. Hume 
exhibits some of the Tale-Teller’s volatility and penchant for “momentous Truths” (Swift 87). 
Whereas earlier Hume admits of conflicts built into the particularity of human desire and the 
effort required to enter into a “common view” of things, he now asserts the intimacy of “the 
correspondence of human souls” (378). However, Hume’s volatility is of a different tincture 




assert his thesis, Hume is guided by the desire to think well of human nature. His effusions tend 
to err on the side of generous optimism: 
For it is remarkable, that when a person opposes me in any thing, which I am strongly 
bent upon, and rouzes up my passion by contradiction, I have always a degree of 
sympathy with him, nor does my commotion proceed from any other origin…The 
sentiments of others can never affect us, but by becoming, in some measure, our own; in 
which case they operate upon us, by opposing and encreasing our passions, in the very 
same manner, as if they had been originally derived from our own temper and 
disposition. While they remain concealed in the minds of others, they can never have an 
influence upon us: And even when they are known, if they went no farther than the 
imagination, or conception; that faculty is so accustomed to objects of every different 
kind, that a mere idea, though contrary to our sentiments and inclinations, would never 
alone be able to affect us. (3.3.2, 378) 
 
Nonetheless, Hume reveals that this principle of sympathy can be undermined. Although we 
readily respond to others’ passions, we cannot be affected if those passions “remain concealed in 
the minds of others” (378). While it is true that the passions provide us with an avenue of mutual 
understanding, the process by which they do so can be easily derailed. 
For Hume, the source of discontent with common life lies in comparison. What obstructs 
our access to common life, or sympathy, is the tendency of our reason to compare. He writes, 
We judge more, of objects by comparison, than by their intrinsic worth and value; and 
regard every thing as mean, when set in opposition to what is superior of the same kind. 
But no comparison is more obvious than that with ourselves; and hence it is that on all 
occasions it takes place, and mixes with most of our passions. This kind of comparison is 
directly contrary to sympathy in its operation, as we have observed in treating of 
compassion and malice. In all kinds of comparison an object makes us always receive 
from another, to which it is compar’d, a sensation contrary to what arises from itself in 
its direct and immediate survey. The direct survey of another’s pleasure naturally gives 
us pleasure, and therefore produces pain when compar’d with our own. His pain, 
consider’d in itself, is painful to us, but augments the idea of our own happiness, and 
gives us pleasure. (3.3.2, 379) 
 
According to Hume’s conception, “comparison is directly contrary to sympathy” (379). Such 
“comparison” and judgments tend to prevent us from commiserating with other people or sharing 




pleasure into a desire for a monopoly on pleasure: “[another person’s] pain, consider’d in itself, 
is painful to us, but augments the idea of our own happiness, and gives us pleasure” (379). 
Thinking deals in ideas, which Hume tells us are necessarily fainter than the original 
impressions. As a result, the more we contemplate another person’s suffering, the more likely we 
are to gain pleasure from the principle of comparison. Thus, we can trace a direct correlation 
between thinking and weakened sympathy. To renew our sympathy, we must participate in the 
activities of common life. 
Language provides one means of renewing our commitment to common life, which 
Hume models for us. He tends to rely on imaginative illustrations and examples from common 
life. These tropes become a way of accessing the common point of view. Hume thus enacts his 
own principles in his writing. For instance, to explain the relationship between sympathy and 
comparison, he uses the example of seamen in a storm: 
Suppose the ship to be driven so near me, that I can perceive distinctly the horror, painted 
on the countenance of the seamen and passengers, hear their lamentable cries, see the 
dearest friends give their last adieu, or embrace with a resolution to perish in each others 
arms: No man has so savage a heart as to reap any pleasure from such a spectacle, or 
withstand the motions of the tenderest compassion and sympathy. It is evident, therefore, 
there is a medium in this case; and that if the idea be too feint, it has no influence by 
comparison; and on the other hand, if it be too strong, it operates on us entirely by 
sympathy, which is the contrary to comparison. Sympathy being the conversion of an 
idea into an impression, demands a greater force and vivacity in the idea than is requisite 
to comparison. (3.3.2, 379) 
In his discussion of the factors that can tip the balance of concern from compassion into 
schadenfreude, Hume conscientiously avoids ascribing evil intent to human nature. He 
emphasizes that envy and malice are the results of less-than-vivacious notions of others’ pain, a 
matter of circumstance rather than will or character. The vivacity of those ideas and ensuing 




perceives the disposition of humanity to be fundamentally corrupt, Hume asserts an optimistic 
view of human nature: “No man has so savage a heart as to reap any pleasure from such a 
spectacle [as a shipwreck], or withstand the motions of the tenderest compassion and sympathy” 
(379). The fault is not in the person, but the circumstance. Hume thus tends to consider “human 
will as an effect [rather than cause]” (Baier 152), an object rather than agent. 
Hume acknowledges that certain distasteful tendencies in human nature cannot be 
dispensed with entirely. Pride, always a target of Swift’s satire, is admitted to be inevitable to 
some extent. Like the Tale-Teller, Hume asserts the necessity for a surface or “disguise” (381). 
However, whereas Swift cannot tolerate this discrepancy between the outside and inside (it is 
intolerable moral filth to him, and the comparison or discrepancy only makes it even more 
unbearable), Hume indulges in surface appearance as a necessary strategy for everyday life in 
human society: 
At least, it must be owned, that some disguise in this particular is absolutely requisite; 
and that if we harbour pride in our breasts, we must carry a fair outside, and have the 
appearance of modesty and mutual deference in all our conduct and behaviour. (3.3.2, 
381) [Hume acknowledges that inside is sometimes ugly] 
Hume strikes a tone much akin to that of a conduct manual: 
We must, on every occasion, be ready to prefer others to ourselves; to treat them with a 
kind of deference, even though they be our equals; to seem always the lowest and least in 
the company, where we are not very much distinguished above them: And if we observe 
these rules in our conduct, men will have more indulgence for our secret sentiments, 
when we discover them in an oblique manner. (3.3.2, 381) 
Hume’s rationale for selfless conduct is very pragmatic: if we act honorably, people will be more 
forgiving of our slips. In other words, Hume is not as much concerned about some absolute 
evaluation of our conduct as how we can coexist as a common. Whereas Swift considers such 




be natural and acceptable, since they do not interfere with common life. In fact, Hume goes on to 
assert the primacy of pride: 
I believe no one, who has any practice of the world, and can penetrate into the inward 
sentiments of men, will assert, that the humility, which good-breeding and decency 
require of us, goes beyond the outside, or that a thorough sincerity in this particular is 
esteemed a real part of our duty. On the contrary, we may observe, that a genuine and 
hearty pride, or self-esteem, if well concealed and well founded, is essential to the 
character of a man of honour. (3.3.2, 382) 
Hume emphasizes the “practice of the world” as the testing ground of his theory about the 
necessity for sincerity in humility. Hume thus explicitly adopts the common point of view to 
elaborate and express his philosophy. He writes that “the object of prudence is to conform our 
actions to the general usage and custom” (382). Likewise, he consults history, an extension of 
“common life and conversation” (382), to support his argument for pride:  
…we observe, that all those great actions and sentiments, which have become the 
admiration of mankind, are founded on nothing but pride and self-esteem. Go, says 
Alexander the Great to his soldiers, when they refus’d to follow him to the Indies, go tell 
your countrymen, that you left Alexander compleating the conquest of the world. This 
passage was always particularly admir’d by the prince of Conde, as we learn from St. 
Evremond. Alexander, said that prince, “abandon’d by his soldiers, among 
barbarians…cou’d not believe it possible any one cou’d refuse to obey him.” (3.3.2, 382) 
 
Hume takes seriously the notion of “common life and conversation” as integral, focal areas of 
existence, so much so that he relies on them as supporting evidence for his argument. Notably, 
his example is given as a series of conversations, first between Alexander and his soldiers, then 
amongst his admirers. For Hume, the most reliable method of avoiding descent into a 
pathological mindset is to tap into the conversation of common life. Hume, unlike Swift, admires 
conquerors like Alexander the Great. Provided that it is sanctioned by custom and celebrated in 
common life, pride does not pose a moral obstacle in Hume’s mind. Hume takes the best 





 Accordingly, Hume proposes that morality derives not from reason, but custom and 
sentiment. Hume’s emphasis on the role of custom and the passions in morality contrasts sharply 
to the views of many of his contemporaries, who believed moral judgment to be the stable 
product of a pure reason (for instance, in his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Reid 
asserts a rational component to moral conviction, writing that “all knowledge got by reasoning 
must be built upon first principles” (Reid 346) and that “There are also first principles in morals” 
(Reid 379). Tellingly, Hume makes his point in a section on “the laws of nations.” Moral 
judgment, according to Hume, must be the product of a more socialized and general capacity 
than that of reason: 
The practice of the world goes farther in teaching us the degrees of our duty, than the most 
subtile philosophy, which was ever yet invented. And this may serve as a convincing proof, 
that all men have an implicit notion of the foundation of those moral rules concerning natural 
and civil justice, and are sensible, that they arise merely from human conventions, and from 
the interest, which we have in the preservation of peace and order. For otherwise the 
diminution of the interest would never produce a relaxation of the morality, and reconcile us 
more easily to any transgression of justice among princes and republics, than in the private 
commerce of one subject with another. (3.2.11, 364) 
Hume suggests a distinction between moral philosophy and morality, where the former strictly 
concerns itself with explanation and the latter with instruction. Hume’s conception of morality is 
clear in its priorities: common life should guide the philosopher, and not the other way around. 
Thus, to learn “the degrees of our duty,” we ought to look to “the practice of the world” (364) or 
common life rather than “abstract speculations” (395). This does not mean that Hume wishes for 
us to give up philosophy, or that philosophy cannot affect common life. On the contrary, Hume’s 
goal in the Treatise is to show how common life is compatible with curiosity. Hume’s point is 
that philosophy must not interfere with the “innocent satisfaction” (1.4.7, 177) of common life. 




The same system may help us to form a just notion of the happiness, as well as of the 
dignity of virtue, and may interest every principle of our nature in the embracing and 
cherishing that noble quality…And thus the most abstract speculations concerning human 
nature, however cold and unentertaining, become subservient to practical morality; and 
may render this latter science more correct in its percepts, and more perswasive in its 
exhortations. (3.3.6, 395) 
 
In other words, Hume says that the study of how things are should not affect common life except 
to assist it. Philosophy must “become subservient to practical morality” (395). If philosophy is to 
alter our common doings at all, it must only be for their betterment, not their destruction. 
Whatever crises occur in the life of mind must not be allowed to spoil the enjoyment of common 






The Hume scholar Donald W. Livingston writes in Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium 
that “the question ‘What is man?’ is a question about humanity and a question which manifests 
an essential human characteristic: self-inquiry” (Livingston 11). Likewise, the question “What is 
madness?” is an introspective question about humanity. As Hume suggests in A Treatise of 
Human Nature, the difficulty in answering that question lies in determining “how far we are 
ourselves the objects of our senses” (Hume 1.4.1, 126). To inquire into the realities of our 
sensory perception and otherwise engage in skeptical inquiry “with regard to the senses” (Hume 
125) is to inquire into “what constitutes a person” (Hume 127), from which Hume draws a 
startling conclusion: “in common life ‘tis evident these ideas of self and person are never very 
fix’d nor determinate. ‘Tis absurd, therefore, to imagine the senses can ever distinguish betwixt 
ourselves and external objects” (Hume 127). If we take Hume’s line of reasoning to the extreme, 
we could understand Hume to say that we can never truly distinguish self-imposed delusion from 
reality – at least, not through introspection. When we see with our senses, our field of vision is 
most occluded with ourselves – our habitual attributions, assumptions, and knowledge. Our 
sensory perception, like our mental perceptions or perceptions in the sense of opinions, is deeply 
linked to our sense of self. But even this degree of subjectivity is no barrier to pursuing a rational 
life of mind. I have tried to show in this chapter that Hume’s reformed notion of rational inquiry 
is quite complex, and in many aspects as volatile as Swift in his understanding of the mind. 
According to Hume, we are always subject to the influence of the passions and the 
imagination. Does Hume then suggest that we are all mad to some extent? I believe he thinks 
otherwise. Hume has a very complicated understanding of human subjectivity. We typically 




example of subjectivity. However, Hume argues that the passions are “an original existence” 
(2.3.3, 266) unto themselves. He goes to great lengths to demonstrate how the passions cannot be 
judged as unreasonable. Moreover, although the passions may contribute to individual 
experience, they are general enough (due to the approximate uniformity of human nature) that 
they also constitute a type of shared experience or common life. Finally, Hume also argues that 
our experience of the physical world is itself subjective. In Book 1 Section 4, “Skepticism with 
Regard to the Senses,” Hume argues that our understanding of the physical world is wholly 
mediated by the process of human perception. We do not experience the world directly through 
the senses. Rather, all sensations are translated into impressions. Notably, Hume classifies as 
impressions “all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the 
soul” (1.1.1, 7), placing on equal ground what are typically considered to be subjective aspects of 
human life, the internal world of psychological states, with the external world of physical 
sensory experience. 
Hume does not use the word madness outright, but he does speak of suffering from 
“philosophical melancholy and delirium” in the conclusion to Book 1.Hume’s conclusions and 
ensuing skepticism cause him to become alienated from common life. We might understand this 
to be Hume’s accepted definition of madness. 
The heated brain of the philosopher can only be cured by her affirmation of common life. 
Once she recognizes Reason to be a false god and converts to common life, she can no longer lay 
claim to any superiority of judgment. She is no more privileged in her access to truth than the 
rest of the commons, for she, too, operates by passion and the imagination. However, since this 
struggle ensues from a basic feature of human nature, she is not exempt from struggle following 




to the same principles which originally led to our crisis. Following her conversion, then, the 
philosopher’s struggle is far from over. She no longer suffers the skeptical crisis, that false 
notion of conflict between reason and the passions or common life. Rather, in recognizing the 
essential weakness of the human mind, its inability to exist apart from common life, the Humean 
philosopher submits to the struggles of common life. 
Swift wished to strip humanity naked to reveal the true nature beneath. Hume believed in 
keeping the polite distance taught by “the practice of the world” (3.3.2, 382), let alone 
undressing in public. He writes, 
The anatomist ought never to emulate the painter; nor in his accurate dissections and 
portraitures of the smaller parts of the human body, pretend to give his figures any 
graceful and engaging attitude or expression. There is even something hideous, or at least 
minute in the views of things, which he presents; and ‘tis necessary the objects shou’d be 
set more at a distance, and be more cover’d up from sight, to make them engaging to the 
eye and imagination. An anatomist, however, is admirably fitted to give advice to a 
painter; and ‘tis even impracticable to excel in the latter art, without the assistance of the 
former. (3.3.6, 395) 
 
If we are to be anatomists at all, then it must be in the service of art. We make incisions in hopes 






Dispelling the Fantasy of Romance:  
Curative Sentiment in Charlotte Lennox’s The Female Quixote 
 The last thing that can be said of a lunatic is that his actions are causeless. If any human 
acts may loosely be called causeless, they are the minor acts of a healthy man; whistling 
as he walks; slashing the grass with a stick; kicking his heels or rubbing his hands. It is 
the happy man who does the useless things; the sick man is not strong enough to be idle. 
It is exactly such careless and causeless actions that the madman could never understand; 
for the madman (like the determinist) generally sees too much cause in everything. The 
madman would read a conspiratorial significance into those empty activities…The 
madman is not the man who has lost his reason. The madman is the man who has lost 
everything except his reason. - G.K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (1908) 
 
Charlotte Lennox’s The Female Quixote (1752) corroborates G.K. Chesterton’s sense of 
madness as a form of hyperactive reason: an over-interpreting paranoia that tends to “read a 
conspiratorial significance into…empty activities” (Chesterton). The notion that reason and 
madness are not too far separated is not a new one. Deranged scholars abound who have 
presumably mastered the art of induction, from Christopher Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus to the 
Astronomer in Samuel Johnson’s Rasselas. Relentless inquiry leads Swift’s Tale-Teller and 
Hume into crisis. In Swift, Hume, and Lennox, we observe the unsustainability of the solitary 
mind and hints that human reason is a deeply flawed faculty. In Swift and Lennox, this madness 
takes the form of a desire for and belief in a limitless, infallible authority centered on the self 
which corrupts language. However, whereas Swift sees human reason as being irreparably, 
irredeemably broken, Hume and Lennox shift their focus away from abstract representations of 
truth or reason and towards the valuation of human relationships and common life. We are not 
rational, but neither are we animals as Swift’s Tale-Teller insinuates. For Hume and Lennox, 




and reason. By sentiment, I mean the Humean notion of passion, the perceptions of the mind 
which have traditionally been called subjective. In both Hume and Lennox, the cure for madness 
requires the acceptance of the fallibility of the self and the true nature of passion (manifest in 
Hume as an acknowledgment of the sentimental basis of human reason and the fictionality of 
heroism in Lennox) as a condition of humanity. In Lennox’s The Female Quixote, this cure 
specifically requires that Arabella abandon her rigid, linguistic fantasies of desire and recover the 
power of sympathy. By sympathy, I mean the Humean capacity for reciprocal sentiment which 
makes social bonds, or common life, possible. 
I would like to make the shocking claim that Arabella’s romantic delusion is not a form 
of female empowerment, but a deeply debilitating (and irritating) pathology of thought akin to 
that of Swift’s Tale-Teller. Love and treatise writing alike take up language as a weapon of 
egotistic conquest. The limitless self-as-conqueror, far from being a shining beacon of self-
actualization, is disruptive in Swift and Lennox, leading to the corruption of language and 
cessation of meaningful conversation. The lengthy love-speech and the Tale-Teller’s treatise 
have in common their long-winded disregard for their listener or readers’ comfort, which tends 
to kill conversations, and in Arabella’s case, any chance of attracting potential suitors. In The 
Female Quixote, the cure for Arabella’s madness requires her to move from one-sided speeches 
of desire to loving dialogues. However, romance novels are not the only scene of such absurd 
conventions. Lennox is no less harsh in her satiric depictions of flirts and dandies. Like romance 
heroines, flirts like Charlotte Glanville or Sir George are guilty of a selfishly fantasizing 
expression of desire that turns the body into an actor of “unmeaning Gestures” (Lennox 279): 
“all that Variety in her Face, and that extreme seeming Earnestness in his Discourse, was 




heroines and flirts alike, language – properly a means of achieving Humean sympathy – is 
corrupted into the signification of individual desire as opposed to achieving the reciprocal 
exchange of sentiment. In Swift as well as Lennox, untrammeled desire is formulated as a kind 
of madness and corruption of language. Madness is epitomized in The Female Quixote as a kind 
of semantic displacement, in which the passions are alienated from their signifiers, and sincere 
reciprocation imperiled. A great deal of attention is given to Arabella’s “distant manner” and 
strange style of speech. Indeed, she never simply talks, but delivers speeches. In that sense, her 
madness is Swiftian. However, there is a cure, and it is strikingly Humean. Only when Arabella 
confronts the fictionality of belief (that is, becoming aware that they are a novelistic product of 
the passions and the imagination, such that her “Heart yields to the Force of Truth,” Lennox 381) 
can she truly ally sentiment with reason and rejoin common life, as exemplified by her union 
with Glanville. Hume’s Treatise redefines the terms of rational inquiry. Similarly, Lennox’s 
Female Quixote reforms the novel of romance. In both, reason is associated with the 
development and recognition of a language of sympathy. 
Critics have largely analyzed Arabella’s madness as a feminist parable about what 
happens to female desire in the eighteenth-century: it is mercilessly denounced and silenced into 
matrimonial compliance with the patriarchy. However, I argue that such interpretations give 
insufficient recognition to the details of female agency in The Female Quixote, or to the 
chastening of male desire in Sir George. After all, Arabella’s desire in its romantically deluded 
form involved its suppression rather than expression, as well as an exaggeration of male desire 
(to the extent that she is convinced that every man she meets has an active interest in ravishing 





You had the Boldness, said she, to talk to me of Love; and you will know that Persons of 
my Sex and Quality are not permitted to listen to such Discourses; and if, for that 
Offence, I banished you my Presence, I did no more than Decency required of me. 
(Lennox 44) 
 
Mr. Glanville, who desired nothing so much as to stay some time longer with his Cousin 
in her Solitude, got his Father to intreat that Favour for him of Arabella: But she 
represented to her Uncle the Impropriety of a young Gentleman’s staying with her, in her 
House…She recollected the many agreeable Conversations she had had with Glanville; 
and wished it had been consistent with Decency to have detained him. (Lennox 66-67) 
 
Arabella reveals that she wishes Glanville to stay longer, and would have assented to Glanville’s 
extended visit if not for the absurdly strict notions of “Decency” acquired from her romance 
novels. Arabella’s romantic delusions cause her to suppress rather than express her desire. If we 
agree with the critic Patricia Meyer Spacks’s thesis that “Romances tell the truth of female 
desire” (1988, 533), then we must accept a very unflattering portrait of female desire, one which 
says that women want to subjugate all men (as the romantic heroines do in the novels that 
Arabella reads) and demand absolute obedience from their lovers. Such an interpretation ignores 
Lennox’s explicit critique of the men who propagate these romance conventions, as embodied by 
the comeuppance of Sir George, who is forced to confess “the ridiculous Farce he had invented 
to deceive her [Arabella]” (Lennox 382). The novels which Arabella reads and most frequently 
refers to – La Calprenede’s Cassandra and Cleopatra, and Artamenes or the Grand Cyrus 
(which Lennox, tellingly, mistakes to be primarily written by Georges de Scudery rather than by 
his sister, Mademoiselle de Scudery; Lennox 62) – were written or presumed to be by men. 
Lennox chastens not female desire in the interest of the patriarchy, but problematic desire in 
general – what Sir George, Charlotte Glanville, and Arabella all have in common is their self-
centered notion of relationships. 
The Female Quixote contains two ideas about language: that it should communicate 




significant that Arabella’s madness derives from reading not just romances, but bad translations 
of them. In other words, her delusion is fueled by a corrupted version of language. Curing her 
romantic delusion requires that she shift from a language of desire to a language of sympathy. 
The romance novel is condemned on the grounds of propagating love as private fantasy rather 
than a relationship of interdependence, much as the romance novel centers language on the self 
rather than as a means to a communicative relationship. 
Critics reading The Female Quixote have tended to suggest the positivity of madness, 
delusion as a vision of female empowerment. Scott Paul Gordon in “The Space of Romance” 
(1998) argues that Lennox uses madness as a novelistic strategy to preserve Arabella from 
charges of self-interest. However, I am not sure that this strategy is entirely successful. 
Arabella’s quixotism is preeminently self-absorption at its finest. She remains an endlessly 
frustrating character for most of the novel. Moreover, if true, this would suggest that Arabella 
need not be cured, that her madness is not problematic, and that it is her cure which is 
problematic. For instance, the critic Catherine Gallagher argues that Arabella’s cure results in the 
surrender of her estate: 
As long as Arabella refuses fiction, resists the suppositional, she owns her estate, 
but when she capitulates to textuality, she becomes the vehicle through which the estate 
descends from her father to his chosen heir, her cousin. When Arabella understands the 
books as mere representations, in other words, she understands her “real-life” function as 
a representation, as a means of transferring and preserving the property by giving herself 
away. Thus a woman’s practice in sympathizing with nobody was a peculiarly fitting 
prelude to disposing of, rather than increasing, her own material substance. (Gallagher 
1994, 195) 
 
I disagree that “when she capitulates to textuality, she becomes the vehicle through which the 
estate descends” (Gallagher 1994) to Glanville. The estate falls to Glanville, regardless of 




I would advise you to think no more of her [Arabella]; content yourself with the Estate 
you gain by her Refusal of you: With that Addition to your own Fortune, you may 
pretend to any Lady whatever; and you will find many that are full as agreeable as your 
Cousin. (Lennox 200) 
 
I argue that Arabella, though she progresses greatly in her awareness, does not advance to 
the extent that she “understands her ‘real-life’ function as a representation, as a means of 
transferring and preserving the property by giving herself away” (Gallagher 195). She certainly 
saw herself as a representation before her cure (a heroine), consequently suffering from reading 
representational excess into everything, and is at last cured when she ceases to think of herself 
and the world in terms of representations. The myth of the heroine – the Ur-representation in the 
romance novel – is debunked. Rather, celebrated in its place is the subsumption of heroic figures 
into marital union and common life. Marriage is depicted as a union that can reconcile the 
inclinations of reason and sentiment – for property and common life. At the end, Arabella and 
Glanville achieve the Humean ideal of sympathy in their union: “Mr. Glanville and Arabella 
were united, as well as in these [Fortunes, Equipages, Titles, and Expence], as in every Virtue 
and laudable Affection of the Mind (Lennox 383).” 
Gallagher’s argument is an interesting take on Arabella’s marriage, but does not explain 
why the other realistic, “compliant” females in the novel, such as Charlotte Glanville, are not 
equally celebrated. I do agree with Gallagher that Arabella’s cure depends on her acceptance of 
fiction as a genre rather than truth. I would like to develop that thought further by suggesting that 
Arabaella’s acceptance of fiction as a genre is tantamount to the deconstruction of the romance 




centered on the heroic self, and that the self is a fallible being animated by its relationships to 
others.
3
 Her cure involves a commitment to the relationship rather than its terms or conventions. 
I will not comment on the political correctness of this position (to put it crudely, that 
madness is solitude and alienation resulting from language corrupted by egocentrism, that the 
death of the self as center is the cure, and that marriage is the ideal consummation of common 
life) but I do argue that it is the position which Lennox’s text develops. The recovery of 
Arabella’s sanity is linked to an ability to shift from a language of fantasizing desire to a mature 
exchange of sentiment that recognizes the self and its desires to be unstable centers, and embrace 
the indefinite freeplay of common life as the anchoring reality. This is the vision of sentiment 
celebrated in Lennox’s novel – when the center of the self (as the basis for defining our 
understanding of the world) is debunked, and we find reality beyond our individual judgment. 
Lennox parodies the genre of the romance novel in the figure of Arabella. Raised in rural 
seclusion by her reclusive father, Arabella addles her brain with her late mother’s stash of badly 
translated French romances, mistaking men for ravishers and prostitutes for genteel ladies 
requiring chivalrous rescue. Her embarrassing delusions prevent Mr. Glanville from marrying 
her straightaway. Arabella is cured only after a series of encounters that superimpose the 
romance novel onto real-world structures. A rival suitor schemes to convince her that Glanville 
is also Ariamenes, a two-timing lover who has abandoned the Princess of Gaul to pursue her. In 
a leap of illogic, Arabella throws herself into the Thames to escape her imagined ravishers and 
gain enduring fame. A long talk with her doctor while recovering from her near-drowning finally 
cures her of her belief in knights, ravishers, and mortal sacrifice. 
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Arabella’s romance form is a supreme form of suppression in herself and others. In a 
conversation with Arabella, Glanville laments that “you have expressly forbid me to tell you I 
love you” (Lennox 113). The romance novel also forbids that she speak of desire, such that the 
greatest expression of affection for Glanville that she can allow herself is to tell him that “I do 
not wish your Death” (Lennox 134). Of course, one can argue that Arabella thus prolongs the 
courtship process, controlling it, but arguably that control is as self-deluding as that of a flirt, 
both of whom only prolong an act of private fantasy rather than engaging real sentiment. 
Through Arabella, Lennox describes how the mind becomes isolated from history and humanity 
in the pursuit of its fantasy. The relentless inquiry of the analytic mind becomes a form of 
neurosis that alienates Arabella from society. Arabella continuously monitors her own behavior 
and that of others for adherence to romance forms. When Sir Charles inquires about her 
relationship with his son, she answers: 
She did not hate him so much, but that his Death would affect her very sensibly. 
Arabella, in speaking those Words, blushed with Shame, as thinking they were rather too 
tender. (160) 
 
Arabella formulates her replies according to vocabulary and syntax demanded by “the Laws of 
Honour and Romance” (116), which always remain foremost in her mind. However, “the Laws 
of Honour and Romance” (116) extend beyond that of a set of linguistic or genre conventions, its 
territory covering morality and manners. Significantly, Arabella groups “Honour and Romance” 
together. She equates form (“Romance”) with the concepts it represents (“Honour”). The 
distinctions between form and concept, manners and morality, become increasingly hazy. 
Arabella constantly considers the image she conveys to others, chastising herself whenever 
she catches herself saying “too much” (115) or being “too tender” according to “the Laws of 




argument that the romance novel speaks the truth of female desire, Arabella’s romantic obsession 
obliges her to suppress any show of her desire.  
Stuck in the conventionalized language of desire and the grammar of romance, she is 
constantly preoccupied with making sure that she and her lovers are adequately heroic. 
Arabella’s desire for heroism requires duels, oaths, and the vanquishing of rivals from her lovers. 
She is obsessed with the extent to which she and others are conforming to her standards (for 
though they are taken from romance novels, amongst the characters they are undoubtedly unique 
to her). The Doctor describes her affliction thus: 
Nothing can hinder you from being the happiest of Mortals, but Want of Power to understand 
your own Advantages…you enjoy all that Intellectual Excellence can confer; yet I see you 
harrass’d with innumerable Terrors and Perplexities, which never disturb the Peace of 
Poverty or Ignorance. (370-371) 
 
The cure for Arabella’s crippling self-concern requires no less than a conversion by a clergyman, 
“a Pious and Learned Doctor” (366). The Doctor’s title in this instance refers to his learnedness 
as a man of the church, but the potential for conflation carries significance. The Doctor, though a 
clergyman, mingles theological sentiment with scientific rigor. His discussions with Glanville 
have the flavor of a physician’s consultations in anticipation of a delicate medical procedure: 
“the Doctor and he [Glanville] agreed to expect for some Days longer an Alteration for the better 
in the Health of her Body, before he attempted the Cure of her Mind” (367). Through the figure 
of the “good Doctor,” Lennox suggests that piety is the ideal tempering of reasoned rigor with 
sentiment. 
That Arabella’s flawed epistemology and distorted moral standards must be cured by the 
same process suggests that reasoned beliefs and moral beliefs share the same sentimental basis as 
in Hume. Indeed, the critic Wendy Motooka (260) argues that Arabella’s frame of mind bears 




about those phenomena, and upon being confronted with the error of her thinking, speculates 
anew with alternative explanations. However, Arabella consistently fails to generate the correct 
conclusion because her mind remains constrained by the limitations of her reason. The mind is 
suited to generating predictions, but the model it uses to generate these predictions is always 
impoverished compared to the real world. The mind cannot transform itself without external 
intervention in the form of sentiment. As long as Arabella remains incapable of sympathy (that 
is, the reciprocal communication of sentiment) and stuck in her private epistemological fantasy 
of romance, she cannot correct the mistaken beliefs which derail her reasoning. Thus, developing 
a language of sympathy is as essential to right reasoning as it is to human relationships. 
Ultimately, an objective account of the sort demanded by rationalists is impossible because 
no event or action can be separated from its interpretation. Meaning is the event. The problem 
with Arabella’s way of understanding the world is not that she observes and then interprets the 
world differently. Observation cannot be separated from the act of interpretation, as both are 
revealed to be continuous with each other. Objectivity is just as much of a fantasy as romance. 
When Arabella sees richly garbed horsemen, nothing within the moment favors or informs one 
description over another. Her discussion with Glanville demonstrates the inseparability of 
description from interpretation: 
Pardon me, Madam, said Mr. Glanville, who was willing to prevent his Father from 
answering her Absurdities; these Men had no other Design, than to rob us of our Money. 
How! said Arabella: Were these Cavaliers, who appeared to be in so handsome a Garb, 
that I took them for Persons of prime Quality, were they Robbers? I have been strangely 
mistaken, if seems: However, I apprehend there is no Certainty, that your Suspicions are 
true; and it may still be as I say, that they either came to rescue or carry us away. (259) 
 
The verbs “rob,” “rescue,” and “carry” posit very different interpretations. There is no way to 
record the event without interpreting the roles of the participants, who might be alternately 




perception is shown to be a reaction of the mind, such that direct observation and acquisition of 
knowledge is not possible. Therefore, we find the truth to be much more complicated than a 
simple accounting of visible phenomena. Lennox suggests that the scientific empiricist may find 
it as difficult as Arabella to determine the truth and generate the correct explanation. 
 Social-moral truth cannot be extricated from what we normally consider to be reality. 
Arabella’s sense of reality is inseparable from that of her morality (her understanding of her 
social obligations). As long as Arabella’s understanding remains solitary and intellectual (and 
therefore rationalizing) rather than social (acknowledging the influence that others have on her), 
she remains captive to the delusions of her romantic paradigms. Before being cured, she is a 
Swiftian empiricist who imposes her hypotheses on others and fails to recognize the interposition 
of the analytical and attributive self in her observations. Arabella remains incapable of freeing 
herself from her romantic delusions when she continues to operate on the basis of assumptions 
gained from books and intellectual arguments rather than the heart. When Arabella encounters a 
kindly Countess who takes Arabella under her wing and tries to cure her, the Countess fails 
because she founds her arguments upon intellectual propositions rather than sentiment. 
Sentiment has all the transcendental force of the divine in its resistance to containment by human 
devices. Sentiment, which occurs above the level of man-made terms and systems, cannot be 
refuted. 
Although Glanville and Sir George both desire Arabella, Lennox makes clear the 
inconsiderate basis of Sir George’s claims: “Sir George was meditating on the Means he should 
use to acquire the Esteem of Lady Bella, of whose Person he was a little enamoured, but of her 
Fortune a great deal more” (Lennox 129).  




of the romance novel as a language of desire, as a means to achieving their private fantasy. 
Lennox portrays their proclivity for the romance language of desire as the result of insufficient 
sympathy for others. Lennox writes of Sir George: 
He resolved to make his Addresses to Arabella in the Form they prescribed; and, not 
having Delicacy enough to be disgusted with the Ridicule in her Character, served 
himself with her Foible, to effect his Designs. (Lennox 131) 
 
As in Swift, language is susceptible to corruption by overreaching ambition. Arabella’s madness 
manifests itself partly as a tyrannical insistence on Glanville’s absolute obedience to her romance 
novel fantasies. Her language of fantasy reduces relationships to “romance Forms” and results in 
many a misunderstanding. After returning home from another adventure, Arabella interrogates 
her maid about how Glanville reacted to her disappearance:  
“What! interrupted Arabella: And didst thou not observe the Tears trickle from his Eyes, 
which, haply, he strove to conceal? Did he not strike his Bosom with the Vehemence of 
his Grief; and cast his accusing and despairing Eyes to Heaven, which had permitted such 
a Misfortune to befal me?” (109) 
 
Lennox draws attention to the way romance novel convention transforms her language from 
communication into self-absorption. Arabella’s questions are rhetorical. Tellingly, the question 
returns to her (“me”) as the focal object. The romance novel, with its emphasis on desire, 
centered on the heroic self, thus corrupts language from an act of communication into an act of 
unfeeling fantasy. 
 Arabella commits the fault of making herself the reference point for her outlook. Thus, 
Glanville’s identity is determined for Arabella as “her Lover” (157), who must prove his identity 
by showing himself to fulfill the criteria for that role: “Courage” and “Valour” (157).   
[Arabella] saw all the Actions of her Lover, and intended Ravisher; and, being possessed 
with an Opinion of her Cousin's Cowardice, was extremely rejoiced to see him fall upon 
his Enemy first, and that with so much Fury, that she had no longer any Reason to doubt 
his Courage: Her Suspicions, therefore, being removed, her Tenderness for him returned; 




plainly perceive the Difference of their Weapons), her Apprehensions for her Cousin 
were so strong, that, though she did not doubt his Valour, she could not bear to see him 
expose his Life for her (157) 
Lennox draws our attention to Arabella’s insistence on seeing. She “saw all the Actions of her 
Lover” and “extremely rejoiced to see him fall upon his Enemy first,” and “saw them engaged 
with their Swords,” and “could not bear to see him expose his Life for her” (157). Arabella 
ironically “did not plainly perceive the Difference of their Weapons” (157). Had she seen that 
Glanville was defending himself against a sword with a mere “hanger” and horse-whip, her 
opinion of Glanville’s courage would have been even more heightened. Arabella thus engages in 
a parody of the scientific method, where her insistence on visual evidence only prevents her from 
seeing with clarity. She observes and makes inferences from those observations, but her 
heuristics are faulty and resistant to change, just as her language is inflexibly imperative. 
Lennox exposes Arabella’s reasoning to be mere rationalization. Her quixotic mode of 
empiricism, which insists on “Distance” (157), the better for observation and admiration, 
prevents her from realizing intimacy and true human understanding. Lennox deplores this 
senseless distancing, which only leads to more misunderstanding. As long as Arabella insists on 
a relationship mediated by romance terms and forms, she limits herself to conditional love, a 
love validated by requisite conditions, and cannot truly be united with Glanville, for her 
relationship will always be mediated by “Suspicions,” “doubt,” and “Apprehensions.” Her 
affections are obstructed by these conditions and prepositions – she is restricted to having 
“Tenderness for him” (157) rather than being able to love him outright. The price to pay for this 
quixotic independence is paranoia and uneasiness, “suspicions” and “doubt.” This is the result of 
that rupture, of rigid definitions (“Lover,” “Lady”) that only exchange one set of uncertainties for 




involving him in a duel. Interestingly, the intellectual components of the mind that we more 
commonly associate with scientific empiricism are what lead Arabella to her great folly in this 
case. Her “suspicions,” “doubt,” and desire to see for herself proof of Glanville’s courage are 
what lead her to make such unreasonable demands of his courage. It is sentiment, not reason, 
which provides a corrective influence. Arabella’s “tenderness” and “Apprehensions” cause her to 
become concerned for Glanville’s life and to desire to put an end to the bloodshed. In this 
episode, language becomes a measure of moral character. Arabella is most at fault when she 
presumes to judge and command Glanville with her language of romance.  
Lennox suggests a hierarchy of valuations through characters that embody each structure: 
Arabella stands for the world of implausible fiction and the romance novel, the Glanvilles and 
the Doctor for the plausible real world, society, and truth. However, we find that the value 
assignments do not remain stable. Arabella is satirized, but so are Charlotte Glanville and 
Glanville’s friend Sir George.  It is true that Arabella’s commitment to the romance novel is 
endlessly ridiculed. On the other hand, Lennox also bestows upon Arabella many conventionally 
romantic qualities that are favorably portrayed. Arabella’s extraordinary eloquence and beauty 
make her objectively admirable. The value distinctions established at the outset repeatedly break 
down in Arabella, as we see that romance values are compatible with real-world values. 
Arabella makes her debut at a ball in a robe styled after her admired heroines of antiquity: 
Scarce had the first tumultuous Whisper escap’d to the Lips of each Individual, 
when they found themselves aw’d to Respect by that irresistible Charm in the Person of 
Arabella, which commanded Reverence and Love from all who beheld her. 
Her noble Air, the native Dignity in her Looks, the inexpressible Grace which 
accompany’d all her Motions, and the consummate Loveliness of her Form, drew the 
Admiration of the whole Assembly (272) 
 
In this scene, the impulses of social propriety and romance novel heroism align. Whereas at the 




here Lennox confirms those expectations as Arabella’s rightful due. Lennox signals the 
indubitable reality of Arabella’s beauty by describing it as “inexpressible” (272). That is, her 
beauty transcends the structures of language, and therefore situates it beyond the romance novel 
structure (the romance novel being a function of language). However, in its very hyperbolic 
excess, Lennox’s description of Arabella participates in the conventions of the romance novel 
and places Arabella firmly within the ranks of other romantic heroines. In this instance, Lennox 
endorses Arabella’s conformity to the “romantic forms” (13). 
Scott Paul Gordon argues that Arabella’s quixotism “protects her from being accused of 
self-interest” (Gordon 512), allowing her to engage in dominating behavior without incurring 
charges of selfishness or coquetry. However, such a valuation of Arabella’s quixotism implies 
that quixotism is a good thing, and falls into the very tendency of contemporary criticism to exalt 
quixotism. 
Without a doubt, Arabella needs to be cured of her annoying habits and self-
righteousness. Lennox suggests the aggravating absurdity of Arabella’s habit of justifying her 
behavior to others with legalistic definitions: “‘I have not, in my Opinion, transgressed the Laws 
of Decency and Decorum, in what I have said’” (161). In so strenuously seeking to fulfill the 
criteria of romance, Arabella neglects the relationship itself, the raison d’etre of romance. For 
relationships require the Other, and the Other constitutes what we cannot articulate. As long as 
Arabella insists on confining romance to what she can articulate in static forms and signs, she 
remains incapable of experiencing it. When Arabella thinks that nothing can change her, that she 
is the dictating force of her relationship with Glanville, she is still not truly in a relationship with 
him. Arabella’s notions of romantic love must be “disappointed” (349) to cure her. Arabella must 




dethroned by no less than a revolution in which “Grief, Rage, Jealousy, and Despair made so 
cruel a War in her gentle Bosom,” 349) before she can enter into a true marriage of love with 
Glanville.  
Arabella must learn to transition from a solitary, self-referential epistemology of thought 
to feelings, which she links with truth and sight: 
Arabella, taking Notice of his pensive Posture, turn’d away her Head, lest by beholding 
him, she should relent, and treat him with less Severity than she had intended; making at 
the same Time a sign to him to be gone. (352) 
 
Lennox associates sight with sentiment. Arabella cannot bear to look at Glanville, for the mere 
sight of him will soften her feelings. In this scene, feeling threatens to disrupt Arabella’s self-
referential romantic delusions. If she would only look at Glanville, she would realize that he 
loves her.  
 Yet, sight is nonetheless fraught with epistemological difficulty. Lennox betrays 
ambivalence towards sight in the concluding incidents of The Female Quixote. Glanville 
mistakes his sister for Arabella. What follows is a brief pantomime from one of Arabella’s 
romance novels – the lover, the rival, the duel, and the dying man’s speech. However, we find 
certain significant details altered. For one, the lady turns out to not be the beloved at all, but the 
man’s sister. The romance form obscures the familiar. Arabella’s veil casts a distorting pall over 
the Glanvilles’ garden. Lennox draws our attention to the dangers of habitual thinking. The 
Glanvilles’ garden becomes a metaphor for a rigidified frame of mind. The accustomed sight of 
“his cousin, cover’d with her Veil as usual” in the garden (357) causes Glanville to assume that 
the veiled lady must be Arabella. The scene enacts Arabella’s epistemology. Forms and 




notably prefaces the scene by noting that “he thought he saw his Cousin” (357), an immediate 
red flag that suggests Glanville is about to commit an Arabellian folly.  
Lennox suggests that reason fails because it cannot account for the unexpected. Rational 
empiricism looks for patterns and makes predictions based on those patterns. Ultimately, the 
heart is what allows one to cope with the unknown and novel. 
His Chamber Window looking into the Garden, he thought he saw his Cousin, 
cover'd with her Veil as usual, hasten down one of the Walks; his Heart leap'd at this 
transient View, he threw up the Sash, and looking out, saw her very plainly strike into a 
cross Walk, and a Moment after saw Sir George, who came out of a little Summer-
house, at her Feet. Transported with Rage at this Sight, he snatch'd up his Sword, flew 
down the Stairs into the Garden, and came running like a Madman up the Walk in which 
the Lovers were. The Lady observing him first, for Sir George's Back was towards him, 
shriek'd aloud, and not knowing what she did, ran towards the House, crying for Help, 
and came back as fast, yet not Time enough to prevent Mischief: For 
Mr. Glanville, actuated by an irresistible Fury, cry'd out to Sir George to defend himself, 
who had but just Time to draw his Sword and make an ineffectual Pass at 
Mr. Glanville, when he receiv'd his into his Body, and fell to the Ground. 
Mr. Glanville losing his Resentment insensibly at the Sight of his Rival's Blood, 
threw down his Sword, and endeavour'd to support him; while the Lady, who had lost 
her Veil in her running, and to the great Astonishment of Mr. Glanville, prov'd to be his 
Sister, came up to them, with Tears and Exclamations, blaming herself for all that had 
happen'd. Mr. Glanville, with a Heart throbbing with Remorse for what he had done, 
gaz'd on his Sister with an accusing Look, as she hung over the wounded Baronet with 
streaming Eyes, sometimes wringing her Hands, then clasping them together in an 
Agony of Grief. (357) 
 
The Glanvilles’ garden supplies a metaphor for psychological blindness. Arabella’s veil of 
romance causes trouble for everyone.  
Like Swift, Lennox decries the rigidity of systems. The Female Quixote is an anti-romance 
and anti-escapist fiction in the sense that the reader is made conscious of the urgent necessity for 
the return to reality. Lennox connects the romantic imagination with rigidity rather than 
transcendence. Arabella is constantly trying to write her own romance. She attributes motives 




mere sight of him in her chamber causes her to faint with the expectation that he will attempt 
violence on her: 
seeing Tinsel, who, confounded to the last Degree at the Cries of both the Lady and her 
Woman, had got into her Chamber he knew not how, she gave herself over for lost, and fell 
back in her Chair in a Swoon, or something she took for a Swoon, for she was persuaded it 
could happen no otherwise; since all Ladies in the same Circumstances are terrify'd into a 
fainting Fit, and seldom recover till they are conveniently carried away; and when they 
awake, find themselves many Miles off in the Power of their Ravisher. (300) 
 
Mr. Selvin is left trying to deny that anything happened. This is perhaps the best example of anti-
narrative: the denial of an event. Notably, Lennox describes Arabella as being “persuaded it 
could happen no otherwise” (300). For Lennox, romance denies possibility. Romance repeatedly 
enacts the fall of man, sin, and fails to achieve that transcendent liberation from the old sinner’s 
narrative. Imagination offers not freedom, but captivity to one’s mind. 
In The Age of Reasons, Motooka argues that 
Focusing on the obstacles to a proper understanding of real virtue – its mistaken nature 
and its changing names – the Countess counsels Arabella to think skeptically about the 
relation between reality and representation…The Countess’ nominalist, unsentimental 
arguments cannot say the essentialist, absolutist Arabella. Abruptly, the Countess 
disappears from the narrative, and the task of curing Arabella falls to the sentimental, 
Johnsonian clergyman. (Motooka 138) 
 
Although I agree with Motooka that there is significance in the Countess’s failure to cure 
Arabella, I argue that this failure proceeds not as much from the incompatibility of certain 
epistemologies as from the fact that she fails to recognize the inadequacy of arguments at all. In 
order to return to common life, in which virtuous living requires both Arabella’s “Romantic 
generosity” and Glanville’s undeluded understanding, Arabella must experience for herself the 
moral consequences of her previous delusions. In other words, Lennox suggests that Arabella’s 
quixotism can only be cured through repentance – Arabella must recognize her inability to 
adhere to romance forms when her feelings betray her, demonstrating the impossibility of 




with the Doctor’s by their shared sentimentalism, as Motooka argues. Lennox suggests that 
sentiment paves the way to moral understanding.  
Lennox envisions the dissolution of structures as the condition that makes possible the 
dissolution of differences. No individual distinction is so insurmountable as to be irreconcilable 
with society. No matter how ingenious the argument, the instability of language ensures that 
those tenets will break down. Hence, the Doctor remarks that “It is of little Importance…to 
decide whether in the real or fictitious Life, most Wickedness is to be found,” 380). Reasoning is 
beside the point – it is always off-center.  
The greatest proof of this is in the way Sir George’s schemes are thwarted. However 
great we might fancy our command of certain conventions to be, the structural instability of 
language ensures that no one person has mastery over another through language. The fluidity of 
distinctions opens up new semantic possibilities that extend beyond the author’s original 
intentions. Despite Sir George’s mastery of the romance forms, he ultimately miscalculates. In a 
classic instance of how text can take on a life of its own, apart from the intentions of the author 
(“he was the Author of their present Mis-understanding; and that he had impos’d some new 
Fallacy upon Arabella, in order to promote a Quarrel between them,” 354), Sir George’s 
stratagems and plotting almost lead to his death and Arabella’s. 
In both instances of Sir George’s attempts to deceive Arabella, Sir George miscalculates 
Arabella’s response terribly. In foisting upon Arabella the false tale of Glanville’s amorous 
treachery through the equally fictitious figure of the Princess of Gaul, Sir George hopes to divest 
Arabella of her affections for his rival Glanville. However, he greatly misjudges how Arabella 




Sir George remains locked in his own fantasy of desire, which prevents him from 
correctly predicting Arabella’s reactions. He thinks Arabella will simply see the light and switch 
affections after finding Glanville to be false. Instead, Arabella is thrown into paroxysms of grief 
and nearly drowns after mistaking some horsemen for ravishers. Sir George also fails to take the 
violence of the Glanvilles’ affections into account. He underestimates the force of Charlotte 
Glanville’s desires, which are so great that she resorts to disguising herself in Arabella’s veil to 
contrive a meeting with him, foiling his plans to beguile Arabella. Glanville is “actuated by an 
irresistible Fury” (357) that leads him to run his sword through Sir George when he thinks he 
sees his rival about to seduce Arabella in his very garden. Sir George is forever scheming, but 
never fully understanding – or perhaps his understanding is too full. That is, he has mastered the 
forms but does not have their sentiment. He has head-knowledge, but not heart.  
By contrast, the “powerful male moralist” (Spacks 535) is also the definitive 
sentimentalist, as embodied in the figure of the Doctor. He “rebukes her [Arabella] for her 
indulgence of her imagination, and implicitly, of her sexual fantasies” (Spacks 535). Spacks 
notes that in the ending, “Arabella, blushing, relinquishes her faith in her own significance,” 
making “Arabella’s successful repression of desire, her great achievement” (Spacks 538). 
However, Spacks overlooks the fact that Arabella’s conversion involves her realization 
(emotional, and eventually nuptial) of her desire for Glanville. It is not simply the case that “The 
claims of fiction and passion yield to those of truth and rationality” (Spacks 535). The Female 
Quixote shares many of the features of romance novels, and the valuations do not always favor 
“truth and rationality” above “fiction and passion” (535). The marriage between Glanville and 
Arabella is a romantic one in which both parties fall madly in love with each other. Glanville’s 




romanticism. We cringe and become exasperated by Arabella’s delusions, not primarily because 
she frustrates her desires, but because she frustrates our desires for a sensible heroine that 
conforms to our ideals and a comfortable reading experience. Arabella violates not only the 
social contract with Glanville, but that with the reader as well. 
Thus, The Female Quixote does not linearly or systematically deny romantic desire in 
favor of reason. Rather, romance and reason can coexist, as in Arabella and Glanville’s 
conveniently romantic marriage. Lennox affirms relationships rather than terms or systems. Both 
Arabella and Charlotte Glanville are condemned for their socially damaging rigidity of thought. 
Lennox thus exposes the failings of a rigidly quixotic system and a system based on social 
propriety or reasonable behavior. It takes no less than a near-death experience and quasi-
religious conversion to correct Arabella’s ways.  
The Doctor’s conversation is meant to be a culminating discourse that encapsulates the 
moral distinctions between fiction and truth. In his attempt to cure Arabella of her delusional 
faith in the principles that govern romance novels, the Doctor attempts to establish a value 
hierarchy of oppositions that privileges truth over fiction. “Yet judging of them [romance novel 
characters] as Christians, we shall find them impious and base, and directly opposite to our 
present Notions of moral and relative Duties” (329).  
However, the Doctor overlooks the fact that the most laudable inhabitants of his world 
are virtuous precisely because of their romantic qualities. In Arabella, the structures of fiction 
and truth lose their clarity of hierarchical distinctions. Her majestic beauty, of fictional, romantic 
proportions, is figured favorably. Arabella is more like a romance novel heroine than a real 
person, whom Lennox portrays as being all the more admirable for the fictional excess of her 




(Arabella) rather than reality (Miss Glanville). By contrast, Lennox portrays Miss Glanville’s 
looks as plausibly pretty, but attached to a personality of correspondingly plausible pettiness. 
The most realistic or believable characters in The Female Quixote are often least laudable. 
Lennox makes clear that Miss Glanville, with all her realistic flaws, is inferior to Arabella on all 
accounts. 
The Doctor attempts to delineate how fiction is subordinate to truth. He heaps scorn on 
“senseless Fictions; which at once vitiate the Mind, and pervert the Understanding; and which if 
they are at any Time read with Safety, owe their Innocence only to their Absurdity” (374). The 
resulting perplexity of structural interactions is suggested in the way that the Doctor substitutes 
several central terms in speaking of the romance novel: “falsehood” (378), “fiction” (377), and 
“physical and philosophical absurdities” (378). Reality is alternately figured as “truth” (377), 
“moral and domestic wisdom” (377), the “world,” (378), “experience” (378), “example” (380), 
and “reason and piety” (380). In this litany of terms, certain tensions are suggested, the most 
significant one being that between “Example” (380) and exemplary moral truth as dictated by 
“reason and piety” (380). We find that a narrative may be true in more than one way, indicating 
its defiance of any one self-sufficient definition. A narrative may be true to the example of the 
typical actions of the world, or it may be true to the exemplary ideals determined by “reason and 
piety” (380). Truth is determined by comparison, and therefore truth is structural. Truth may be 
the ruler by which we judge merit, but the ruler itself is a product of arbitrary decree, the 
measuring notches themselves measured relative to their positions to each other.  
Upon closer examination, truth as the organizing principle becomes difficult to define. 
We find that we do not have a very good grasp at all of truth. The former dialectic definition of 




all fictions are untruthful: “Truth is not always injured by Fiction” (377). Significantly, he does 
not make a positive assertion about what truth constitutes. He can only situate truth in negative 
relation to other terms of his discourse (by stating what truth is not), or with adjectives that locate 
it relative to other structures (Christian “piety,” 377; “present Notions of moral and relative 
Duties,” 329). Upon closer examination, we find truth difficult to distinguish from the 
“Perfection of Fiction” (378). 
Indeed, the Doctor argues that the best fiction may be recognized by “its Resemblance to 
Truth” (378). Good fictions, we are told,  
convey the most solid Instructions, the noblest Sentiments, and the most exalted Piety, in 
the pleasing Dress of a Novel, and, to use the Words of the greatest Genius in the present 
Age, ‘Has taught the Passions to move at the Command of Virtue.’ The Fables of Aesop, 
though never I suppose believed, yet have been long considered as Lectures of moral and 
domestic Wisdom. (377) 
 
Thus, truth, as the organizing principle of reality, is indeed “within the structure and outside it” 
(Derrida 1). Truth can be found within the structure of history, but also lies in its purest moral 
forms in “the pleasing Dress of a Novel” (377).  
According to the Doctor, the romance novel “disfigures the whole Appearance of the 
World” (378). However, we find that the world itself is disfigured, and that the Doctor’s 
assertions do not hold up as sustainable distinctions. When we consider the examples of Arabella 
and Miss Glanville, we find the latter’s personality to be warped by her realism. It is reality 
which mars and intrudes upon the “Perfection of Fiction” (378). There is no true heroism in 
society, only “Mock-Heroicks” (335) and the insipid manners of “good breeding” that pass for 
good morals. Likewise, there is no true beauty in the reality that Lennox depicts in Charlotte 
Glanville, only the artificial result of hours of primping and dressing in front of the mirror. The 




reveals the uncertainty of truth. We can speak of what seems or appears in terms of its 
relationship to the observer (perspective), but not directly of what is (facts). 
When Arabella observes that reality does not exemplify moral truth, the Doctor cannot 
and does not attempt to reconcile these divergent structural definitions of truth. He replies that “It 
is of little Importance…to decide whether in the real or fictitious Life, most Wickedness is to be 
found. Books ought to supply an Antidote to Example” (380). The Doctor adopts the language of 
relativity and opposition in his definition of good books as the “Antidote to example” (380). His 
discourse thus enacts his ethic of interdependency.  
In his pronouncement that “Books ought to supply an Antidote to Example” (380), the 
Doctor’s original valuation of realism above falsehood threatens to collapse. In this dialectic 
definition of good fiction, the Doctor suggests that books ought not to be representations of real 
life, but to depict ideals. By extension of this view, we must conclude that virtuous ideals and 
real life are mutually exclusive, and that virtuous ideals have more in common with fiction than 
reality. Moral truth finds perfect expression in fiction rather than reality. In this way, the original 
hierarchical valuations of truth above fiction begin to break down as the boundary between the 
ideal and the imaginary begins to blur. 
Regardless of authorial intention (for instance, Lennox’s attempts to establish a value 
hierarchy that subordinates fiction to truth), the text proliferates a perplexing array of 
distinctions; such is the sandy foundation upon which the author’s structures are built. 
Structurality draws our attention to language as an inherently fallible instrument of 
differentiation. One might well observe that “nothing is more different from a human Being, than 
Heroes or Heroines” (380) as the Doctor does, but it is not very long before one recognizes that 




Yet, Lennox suggests that short-lived as these structures are, their fleeting existence 
simply reflects the temporality of our own mortal bodies, and are useful for as long as they last. 
Structures, whether textual or fleshly, remain useful insofar as they permit us to develop 
relationships, to live, and to love. For Lennox, it is unnecessary to assign absolute, enduring 
values. Lennox is not interested in determining with nanometric precision the measure of moral 
truth in one person or domain compared with another. Social and relative values are much more 
important – human relationships take precedence above philosophical questions of meaning. The 
Doctor argues that 
It is impossible to read these Tales without lessening part of that Humility, which by 
preserving in us a Sense of our Alliance with all human nature, keeps us awake to 
Tenderness and Sympathy, or without impairing that Compassion which is implanted in 
us as an incentive to Acts of Kindness. (381) 
 
The limited and interdependent nature of structure serves to remind us of our own social-moral 
obligations as mortal and insufficient beings indebted to the Christian God. The Doctor 
welcomes the subversion of authorial intent in freeplay as an intervention against the perils of 
hubris. The impossibility of inhabiting a structure separate from all other structures (as when 
Arabella attempts to assert the supremacy of the romance novel) fosters “Humility” (381). 
The Doctor has no desire to establish permanent distinctions. Instead, he seeks to order 
the world through a taxonomy founded upon marriages of antitheses (for instance, in his 
classification of good fiction as an “Antidote to Example,” 380). His mission to help Arabella 
recover her “Alliance with all human nature” (381) is facilitated by the unsustainability of 
distinctions. Only when Arabella becomes cured of her distinctive beliefs can she enter into her 
union with Glanville. Marriage celebrates the dissolution of self-as-distinction. By tracing the 
freeplay of Derridean structure, we may thus discern in The Female Quixote a parable about 




 Lennox locates the transcendental in the heart, in what cannot be named or explained, 
where the relationships between terms rather than the terms themselves become privileged.  She 
thus affirms the ordinary (i.e., lacking distinction) as extraordinary, transcending the ordinary 
distinctions of written language. In accepting that there is no need for differentiation and 
embracing the ordinary, we free ourselves to transcend the realm of ordinary reality. Refusing to 
become tied to “romantic forms” frees us to enter into the truest kind of union, without alienating 
differences that would nurture distrust or suspicion. Thus, Lennox notes: 
Sir George, entangled in his own Artifices, saw himself under a Necessity of confirming 
the Promises he had made to Miss Glanville during his Fit of Penitence, and was 
accordingly married to that young Lady, at the same Time that 
Mr. Glanville and Arabella were united. 
We chuse, Reader, to express this Circumstance, though the same, in different Words, as 
well to avoid Repetition, as to intimate that the first mentioned Pair were indeed only 
married in the common Acceptation of the Word; that is, they were privileged to join 
Fortunes, Equipages, Titles, and Expence; while Mr. Glanville and Arabella were united, 
as well in these, as in every Virtue and laudable Affection of the Mind. (383) 
As long as we insist on definitions and conformity with the “Laws of Decency and Decorum,” 
we remain, like Miss Glanville, restrained to an existence of the most quotidian order, one of 
mere legal agreement. Only when Arabella relinquishes her insistence upon extraordinary 
romance can she truly enter into a loving union with Glanville that transcends ordinary notions 
of marriage. Lennox thus suggests that human ideals and notions of propriety are legalistic. As 
long as we are bound to terms and definitions, we become captive to self-referential 
epistemologies like that of Arabella. 
Analyses of the 18
th
 century have tended to emphasize the Enlightenment’s notion of the 
rational, logical mind as a patriarchal instrument of domination. However, Lennox, Swift, and 
Hume all suggest that such a formulation is reductive and neglects the importance of 




the underpinning of morality. Without emotions, Arabella would have had no way of breaking 
out of her self-reinforcing system of quixotic delusions. Emotion alone can fracture the illusions 
and rationalizations of the imaginative mind. Lennox situates social and moral truth in the 
feelings of the heart rather than any disingenuous conclusion drawn by the thinking and 
rationalizing mind. Arguments become yet another structure of wish fulfillment in The Female 
Quixote. Glanville’s interest in arguments only extends as far as their usefulness in helping him 
to fulfill his desire for Arabella. This is not to say that Lennox herself does not believe in reality 
or moral values, but that she believes that moral values are best calibrated to relationships rather 
than rigid and excessively abstracted systems.  
Spacks observes that “fiction, which, dressed by desire, arouses feeling and threatens 
rationality” (Spacks 541). She argues that “desire involves true feelings” (541). However, I argue 
that feelings and rationality (in the sense of truth or reason) need not be opposed. In The Female 
Quixote, feelings transform Arabella and set her on the path to recovery. Lennox depicts 
Arabella’s repentance as the transformation of egocentric desire into reciprocal love, personal 
fantasy into mutual relationship. Spacks writes that “wishes…possess their own truth” (Spacks 
541). However, Arabella’s behavior suggests much to the contrary.  Desire speaks in the 
monologues and commands of Arabella’s beloved romance novels, turning a shared feeling into 
a demanding egocentric fantasy. Lennox informs us that Arabella is “kept in a continual Anxiety 
by a Vicissitude of Hopes, Fears, Wishes, and Disappointments” (8). Romance novels, as 
structures of wish fulfillment, inscribe love into a set of stipulations (the romance novel heroine 
adopts at face value the saying “your wish is my command”). Love is always conditional in 




For a quixote like Arabella, jealousy is the awakening of the suspicion that one’s desires 
are not fulfilled. Hence, Arabella must experience jealousy in order to be disabused of her notion 
that desire or “love was the ruling principle of the world” (7). Jealousy is the result of direct 
competition between paradigms perpetuated by the self and those by society, of desire as 
individual fantasy and love as a shared social reality. Sentiment breaks her cognitive illusions. 
Lennox portrays the thinking mind as an instrument of rationalization that in Arabella only 
serves to sustain delusions through over-analysis.  Sentiment alone can fracture the illusion and 
lead to moral understanding and alignment. In this sense, Lennox confirms the trope that solitude 
leads to madness. Philosophy cannot save Arabella; only feelings can. Only belief in Glanville’s 
betrayal can shock Arabella into her senses. To understand the rupture between romance forms 
and experience, or language and meaning, Arabella must experience firsthand the deconstruction 
of romance novel forms. The Doctor’s task ultimately consists of converting Arabella, displacing 
her romance language and impious, egotistic worldview. Essentially, Arabella’s greatest fault is 
hubris. Her claim to wielding the moral imperative verges on transgression into the domain of 
the Christian God. She ventures to test and pronounce judgment on everybody. 
Arabella’s repentance is indicated by her newly acquired insight into herself, proof of her 
realization of her vulnerability in being subject to influence from others: 
It is not necessary, Sir, interrupted Arabella, that you strengthen by any new Proof a 
Position which when calmly considered cannot be denied; my Heart yields to the Force of 
Truth, and I now wonder how the Blaze of Enthusiastic Bravery, could hinder me from 
remarking with Abhorrence the Crime of deliberate unnecessary Bloodshed. 
I begin to perceive that I have hitherto at least trifled away my Time, and fear that I have 
already made some Approaches to the Crime of encouraging Violence and Revenge. I hope, 
Madam, said the good Man with Horror in his Looks, that no Life was ever lost by your 
Incitement. Arabella seeing him thus moved, burst into Tears, and could not immediately 
answer. Is it possible, cried the Doctor, that such Gentleness and Elegance should be stained 
with Blood? Be not too hasty in your Censure, said Arabella, recovering herself, I tremble 




only consulting my own Glory; but whatever I suffer, I will never more demand or instigate 
Vengeance, nor consider my Punctilios as important enough to be balanced against Life. 
(381) 
 
Emotions prevent Arabella from answering “immediately” (381), allowing her to engage in 
dialogue. Rather than dominating the conversation as she previously would have done, Arabella 
allows the Doctor to speak and correct her. Arabella’s emotional vulnerability translates into 
linguistic and moral redemption. Arabella’s language also indicates her new insight into her 
position. The interposition of “I” visually indicates Arabella’s location on the page and 
demonstrates the de-centeredness of the self (“I” is not at the center of the page, but scattered 
throughout, and only its relation to other words gives it meaning). Speaking in the first person 
dramatizes the minimization of the person; whereas the third person expands the self (in 
Arabella’s instance, from the monosyllabic “I” to the full four syllables of her name), the first 
person recognizes “I” to be a limited cipher, a subject rather than object of the world’s attention. 
The Doctor’s “miracle” ascribes agency to supertextual and therefore superhuman forces: 
The Doctor confirmed her in her new Resolutions, and thinking Solitude was necessary to 
compose her Spirits after the Fatigue of so long a Conversation, he retired to acquaint Mr. 
Glanville with his Success, who in the Transport of his Joy was almost ready to throw himself at 
his Feet, to thank him for the Miracle, as he called it, that he had performed. (382) 
 
Arabella gains new life. Here, the “success” of the conversion is conflated with that of her 
physical recovery. “Resolution” nicely encapsulates this conjunction of scientific analysis and 
spiritual epiphany. Resolution is the untying or separation of something into its original 
components, the break-up or undoing of a structure that is simultaneous with the revelation of a 
new one (OED). It is also the loosening of something into a relaxed state. In this light, 
“resolution” suits Arabella’s circumstance exactly, suggesting how the deconstruction of her 




 The self is recreated and therefore decentralized in the syntax: “The Doctor confirmed 
her in her new Resolutions” (382). The self becomes the grammatical object. Here, strength of 
will derives from association, as suggested in the verb “confirmed” (“con” – “together,” firmare 
– “to strengthen, make fast,” OED). In other words, the dissolution of distinctions results in a 
new, stronger self, or distinctiveness from togetherness. Composition of the self requires the 
association or putting-together of several elements; identity is drawn from coherence rather than 
difference. To join is to create. By joining words, the Doctor succeeds in helping Arabella to 
rejoin the world in her understanding, a feat that Glanville hails to be no less than a “miracle” 
(382). 
Arabella’s language undergoes reformation, from monologue to dialogue. Her language is 
no longer beholden to the tyranny of the sign. Arabella reaches a more perfect understanding, in 
which words, dumb signs, and silences meld in conjugal communication. When Arabella 
apologizes to Glanville she uses a blend of strategies, no longer relying on long monologues and 
signs. Arabella learns to speak and participate in the language of relationships. Rather than 
attempting to define and justify her behavior according to a set of criteria, she acknowledges the 
Other’s influence: 
[Arabella], turning to Mr. Glanville, whom she beheld with a Look of mingled Tenderness 
and Modesty, To give you myself, with all my remaining Imperfections, is making you but a 
poor Present in return for the Obligations your generous Affection has laid me under to you; yet 
since I am so happy as to be desired for a Partner for Life by a Man of your Sense and Honour, I 
will endeavour to make myself as worthy as I am able of such a favourable Distinction. 
Mr. Glanville kissed the Hand she gave him with an emphatic Silence, while Sir Charles, in 
the most obliging Manner imaginable, thanked her for the Honour she conferred both on himself 
and Son by this Alliance. (383) 
 
Glanville becomes a Christ-like figure of overwhelming, tolerant love. Arabella speaks the language 
of reciprocity (“making you but a poor Present in return for the Obligations your generous 




understanding: “I am so happy as to be desired” (383). Lennox suggests how ordinary “generous 
Affection” is so much the more desirable than romance. Whereas ordinary affection is reciprocal, 
romance is egocentric in its relationally damaging insistence on the exaltation of heroism. 
The Doctor bases his arguments against romance novels partly on the modern 
consciousness of progress. He argues the present to be a more civilized state, one tamed of 
unpredictability. In service of his later assertion that “nothing is more different from a human 
Being, than Heroes or Heroines” (380), he observes: 
the Order of the World is so established, that all human Affairs proceed in a regular 
Method, and very little Opportunity is left for Sallies or Hazards, for Assault or Rescue; 
but the Brave and the Coward, the Sprightly and the Dull, suffer themselves to be carried 
alike down the Stream of Custom. (379) 
 
Here as in Hume, the “Stream of Custom” (379), the forces of history and society, must overrule 
individual desire. The natural order of common life obviates the need and “Opportunity” for 
chivalric protection. The “Brave and the Coward” behave alike, according to the demands of 
polite “Custom.” The Doctor aims to integrate the heroine Arabella into society by abolishing the 
systems that have led to her fantastical world.  “Heroes or Heroines” imply genre, a world 
instituted on the basis of individualistic systems. Therefore the Doctor favors the “human Being” 
over “Heroes or Heroines” as the preferred term. The non-exclusivity of the label “human 
Being” makes it amenable to socialization. The Doctor seeks not to abolish all structures, but 
only egocentric, highly individualistic structures that resist socialization and disrupt human 
relationships. 
The Doctor denies aspiring heroes and heroines their fantasies of “Love” (381) as the 
organizing principle. The self-centered universe sows the seeds of its own deconstruction 
because self-identity depends on and is destabilized by its social context. By pluralizing “Heroes 




“Love” or desire is the “ruling principle of the world,” one must question whose desire it is that 
should govern everyone. Human society would not function were everyone to consider 
themselves heroes and heroines deserving of “Worship” (380). Indeed, Sir George’s efforts to 
persuade Arabella to adore him end in disaster.  
In The Female Quixote, proof of experience lies in feelings rather than intellectual 
speculations or propositions. Lennox does not favor thought over sentiment. She neither partakes 
in nor desires objectivity, for objectivity is irrelevant to her desire for social harmony. Motooka 
observes that “There is a method to Arabella’s madness, and that method looks strikingly similar 
to the empiricist epistemology employed by her ‘rational’ companions” (Motooka 260). Lennox 
suggests that quixotism and empiricism are just as likely to lead one astray, being rationalizing 
forms of thought, such that one mode of thinking does not necessarily bring us any closer to 
reason than the other. Arabella’s anxiety and paranoia, consequences of possessing an over-






Touched in the Head and Heart: Conclusion 
At the end of Lennox’s Female Quixote, Arabella undergoes a conversion from heroic 
alienation to the joys of common life, as signified by her marriage. The former, uncritical belief 
in the self is abandoned. She no longer claims to be an authorial arbiter of reality, but recognizes 
the heroic self to be an ultimately unsustainable fictional construct. Sentiment is confirmed as the 
basis for common life and the way out of self-delusion. In this way, Lennox’s novel continues 
the reevaluation of the crisis of mind which was taken up in Swift and Hume. 
This study has suggested the ways in which Swift, Hume, and Lennox model the tensions 
between madness and common life. Certainly, for these writers as well as popular opinion in the 
eighteenth century, madness was seen as a state of social-moral alienation, the mind in disorder. 
In the Age of Reason, any disruption of the rational order of the mind was to be dreaded 
intensely. Swift even takes that one step further, accepting that there is no reliable distinction 
between madness and reason. In Some Thoughts on Free-Thinking, Swift writes, 
Discoursing one day with a prelate of the kingdom of Ireland, who is a person of 
excellent wit and learning, he offered a notion applicable to the subject, we were then 
upon, which I took to be altogether new and right. He said, that the difference betwixt a 
mad-man and one in his wits, in what related to speech, consisted in this: That the former 
spoke out whatever came into his mind, and just in the confused manner as his 
imagination presented the ideas. The latter only expressed such thoughts, as his judgment 
directed him to chuse, leaving the rest to die away in his memory. And if the wisest man 
would at any time utter his thoughts, in the crude indigested manner, as they come into 
his head, he would be looked upon as raving mad. And indeed, when we consider our 
thoughts, as they are the seeds of words and actions, we cannot but agree, that they ought 
to be kept under the strictest regulation. And that in the great multiplicity of ideas, which 
one’s mind is apt to form, there is nothing more difficult than to select those, which are 
most proper for the conduct of life.  
Madness here is a release of the tendencies that we usually suppress. For Swift, madness was a 
satirical device and confirmation of the latent irrationality that lurks in all of us. The mind is 




his darker moments, Swift suggests that at best, one can only hope to hide one’s madness, 
perhaps by mixing with people of a similar proclivity. In Swift’s “Digression Concerning 
Madness,” this madness takes the form of a relentlessly diagnostic, theorizing impulse that 
threatens the integrity of common language. Madness is figured as an assault on common life, 
culminating in the satirical assertion of an impracticable thesis. The empire of reason, says Swift, 
will always bear evidence of deficiencies in its ruler. 
 Swift and Hume both find themselves in crisis as they reflect on the inadequacy of human 
reason. However, Swift never quite frees himself from his fretful preoccupation with our 
cognitive failings and even seems to find them insurmountable. By contrast, in his Treatise 
Hume argues that our flawed reason is no barrier to rational inquiry or common life. For Hume, 
sentiment paves the way from madness to the sanity of common life. Though our flawed reason 
prevents us from directly accessing an objective reality, we nonetheless have entry to a realm of 
shared experience through the passions. By the principle of sympathy, we respond to and 
understand each other’s sentiments. Hume thus emphasizes sanity and philosophy as a 
constructive process of the passions in conjunction with the imagination and reason.  
 Lennox shares Hume’s belief in the capacity of sentiment to compensate for the failings 
of human reason. Lennox’s Female Quixote shows how sentiment can pierce even the most 
severe delusion. The “Order of the World” consists in this: the individual is to be subsumed by 
the “Stream of Custom” (Lennox 379), a concept which we have previously encountered in Swift 
and Hume. Neither common life nor custom is to be confused with the authoritarian order of an 
ambitious conqueror. Rather, Swift, Lennox, and Hume extol the natural order of common life 






The traditional view held that reason was the rightful ruler of the mind. To allow either 
the passions or imagination to hold sway over the mind was to succumb to madness. However, 
what was considered madness in the eighteenth century would come to be venerated by the 
Romantics as the brilliant, transcendent visions of the individual. In their celebration of the 
passions and involuntary motions of the mind, the Romantics seemed to take at face value 
Hume’s assertion that “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” (2.3.3, 266). 
Wordsworth writes in his “Preface” to the second edition (1800) of Lyrical Ballads that poetry is 
“the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings.” In the age to come, no longer would the 
influence of the passions or imagination be dreaded. The departure from common life was to be 
exalted as a moment of sublime genius.  
Yet, Hume and many of his contemporaries would say that these spontaneous 
outpourings are ultimately unsustainable. The heroic self cannot endure apart from common life 
indefinitely. Not only that, but these visions can only be fulfilled at horrific expense to common 
life. This truth in Hume’s wisdom is pointedly observed by the critic F. L. Lucas: “Had men 
taken him [Hume] to heart, there would have been no French Terror, no Paris Commune, no 
Marxism and no Nazism, no World Wars” (78). We could do much worse than to take a leaf out 
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